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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INTRODUCTION
The key to effective [corporate] accountability today appears to be the
existence of a class of "permanent" owners, holding approximately
one-quarter of the outstanding equity, who have an incentive to moni-
tor the operations of the corporation. This is essentially the system in
Germany, Britain, and Japan.... In the United States, encouraging a
pattern of domestic institutional ownership will be a way of ensuring
the continuance of effective governance. The challenge, then, for the
United States is to identify its "permanent" shareholder institutions
and to ensure that they have the incentive and ability to perform the
monitoring function.
1
As recently as a few years ago, the ability and desire of cor-
porate shareholders to mount a challenge over corporate gov-
ernance2  seemed suspect. After all, shareholders were
considered to be passive, impotent, and unconcerned. A share-
holder revolution, however, is occurring, highlighted by the as-
cendancy of the institutional investor.3 This development,
combined with the current anti-shareholder corporate govern-
ance trend, renders obsolete much of contemporary corporate
1. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINow, POWER AND AccoUNTABnxrY
243-44 (1991) (emphasis added). Monks and Minow believe that pension funds
supply the necessary core of "permanent" shareholders. Id at 262.
2. As used herein, "corporate governance" defines the process by which
the balance of power between a corporation's shareholders and nonsharehold-
ers is allocated. Nonshareholders include the corporation's board of directors,
officers, creditors, suppliers, and customers. The current framework of corpo-
rate governance is defined through state-enacted corporate codes, case law,
and customized corporation-specific provisions such as articles of incorporation
and bylaws.
3. Monks and Minow, acknowledging this new regime, explain:
[W]e are now witnessing the reagglomeration of ownership of the
largest corporations, so that long-term shareholders are well on the
way to majority ownership of America's companies. They are, of
course, the institutional shareholders, who invest collections of indi-
viduals' assets through pension funds, trusts, insurance companies,
and other entities.
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 1, at 18.
"Notwithstanding major differences among them, institutional investors
as a group, have vastly expanded their economic sphere of influence in a
number of important ways. Moreover, while they may be diverse, a high con-
centration of economic power resides among a relatively small and extraordi-
narily stable group of institutions." Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of
Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary of Research at the Co-
lumbia Institutional Investor Project, Presented at The Conference on the Fi-
duciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, Leonard J. Stern School of
Business, New York University (June 14, 1990), in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS:
PAsSIVE FIDuCIAuES TO ACTVIST OwNERs 406, 406-07 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 704, 1990) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS].
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law doctrine and practice. As a result, corporate law is in flux
and turmoil.
"[A]n extraordinary ferment of activity in the field of cor-
porate governance"4 has resulted, including the proliferation of
state-adopted and corporation-imposed antitakeover mecha-
nisms such as the poison pill,5 increased involvement by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and intense criticism
by institutional investors of current corporate governance
structures and mechanisms. Such intense controversy sur-
rounding corporate governance issues appears inevitable given
the far-reaching economic and social impact of the modern cor-
poration.6 The stakes are enormous.
7
4. Roswell B. Perkins, The President's Letter, 4 A.L.I. REP. 1 (1982),
quoted in Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Introduction to the American Law Insti-
tute's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 496 (1984).
5. Poison pills or shareholder rights plans typically are stock warrants or
rights which allow the holder to buy a suitor's stock at low prices ("flip-
overs") or to sell target stock to the target itself ("flip-ins"). See, e.g., P. John
Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving
State Authority Over Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of
Interstate Stock Through Federal Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1109, 1156 (1989).
The Investor Responsibility Research Center, an independent non-profit re-
search group, found that 51% of large American companies were armored with
poison pills as of August, 1990. Majority of Large U.S. Corporations Have
Adopted Poison Pills, IRRC Finds, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
47, at 1659 (Nov. 30, 1990); see also Kozyris, supra, at 1125 n.59 ("If the recent
trends continue, virtually all major corporations will be transformed into for-
tresses in the near future.").
6. "Today ... the corporation is the dominant form of business organiza-
tion[,J ... account[ing] for about 89 percent of business receipts.... [O]verall,
the business corporation is the principal form for carrying out business activi-
ties in this country." ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 1.1, at 1-2 (1986).
Few governance issues affect society as broadly and intensely as corporate
takeovers. Thus, "[n]o current corporate issue has attracted more attention
from legal and economic scholars than takeover defensive moves by corporate
managers." Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract,
78 GEO. L.J. 71, 72 (1989). For commentary probing major economic concerns
over takeover activity and antitakeover devices, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Controk A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Con-
trol Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981) [hereinafter Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids]; Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive
Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51
(1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
[Vol. 76:13131316
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The current corporate governance framework does not ade-
quately address the evolution of the nature and role of modern
institutional investors. Accompanying institutional investors'
growth and concentration of share ownership8 is their desire
and ability to participate meaningfully in governance issues.9
Moreover, at no time has the need for shareholder activism
been more acute; the marked downturn in takeovers 0 this dec-
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981) [here-
inafter Gilson, A Structural Approach]; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance
in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter
Lipton, Corporate Governance]; Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom. A Response to Professors Easterbrook & Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1231 (1980) [hereinafter Lipton, Target's Boardroom]; John H. Matheson &
Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Bal-
anced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425 (1991); Dale A. Oes-
terle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in
Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985);
Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 229 (1986); see also Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share
Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427, 1434-44 (1964) (explaining how shareholders
may react to tender bids, mergers, and proxy fights).
7. See Martin Lipton, A Proposal For a New System of Corporate Govern-
ance: Quinquennial Election of Directors, (June 11, 1990), in INSTITUTIONAL
INvESToRS, supra note 3, at 61, 63 ('"The stakes are large. Indeed, I believe
that the health and vitality of our entire economy is at risk.").
8. Institutional investors' ownership of publicly held corporations has
grown explosively in recent years. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811,
827-29 (1992); Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1477-78; see also Richard H.
Koppes & Kayla J. Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Committee, DIRECTORs &
BOARDs, Spring 1991, at 29, 29-30 ('"e reality is that institutional investors
are growing in size and will continue to control larger and larger blocks of out-
standing equity [resulting] in a shareholder group that is profoundly different
9. Institutional Voting Research Service Client Advisory Letter (July
1990) [hereinafter July 1990 Client Advisory Letter], in INSTITUTiONAL INVES-
TORS, supra note 3, at 33, 34 ("Concentrated ownership has given rise to a new
form of corporate governance whose ultimate shape and structure has yet to
be fully defined .... ."); James A. White, Shareholder-Rights Movement Sways
a Number of Big Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1991, at Cl ("The solid wall
of corporate opposition to shareholder-rights proxy measures is beginning to
crumble, as big pension funds win concessions from an unprecedented number
of large companies.").
10. No governance issue has received more attention than the impact of
takeovers and antitakeover weaponry upon shareholders and nonshareholders.
For commentary on this issue, see Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State
Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988); Henry N. Butler, Corporation-
Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 365; John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MiCH. L. REV. 1 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stake-
holders, and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435 [hereinafter Coffee, Takeover Re-
1992] 1317
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ade11 eliminates the potential disciplinary force that the threat
of takeovers can have upon management.12 Although commen-
tators have struggled to keep pace with institutional share-
holder activism 13 amid this changing corporate landscape,14
form]; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1862 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Williams Act];
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Stat-
utes, 87 MICH. L. REv. 846 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Missing the
Point]; Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Ef-
fects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Jonathan R.
Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 WIs.
L. REV. 467; Matheson & Olson, supra note 6; Roberta Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987).
11. See Merger, Acquisition Activity Fell 18% In First Quarter, Hitting an
11-Year Low, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1991, at A2 ("Merger and acquisition activ-
ity plummeted to an 11-year low in the first quarter [of 1991], with the number
of transactions off 18% from a year earlier... continuing the decline that ap-
peared in 1990 when potential deals fell 12% from 1989.").
12. Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96, 100 ("It is impossible to overstate how
deeply the market for corporate control has changed the attitudes and prac-
tices of U.S. managers.... [That market] represents the most effective check
on management autonomy ever devised."); White, supra note 9, at C1 (quot-
ing Nell Minow, president of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., a Wash-
ington proxy consultant who explains: "This year['s shareholder activism] is
unusual because the takeover activity that fueled momentum for [corporate
governance] proposals in other years hasn't been there.").
Commentators discount the effectiveness of hostile takeovers to discipline
corporate management for varying reasons. Compare Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institu-
tional Investors, 43 STAN L. REv. 863, 870-71 (1991) ("Given the contribution of
hostile takeovers to portfolio values during the 1980s, institutional investors
were quite right to target defensive tactics in their initial foray into the corpo-
rate governance debate.... [Nevertheless, t]he hostile takeover has proved to
be an expensive and inexact monitoring device ... .") with Martin Lipton &
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quin-
quennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 198 (1991) (asserting
that "the hostile takeover is not a particularly effective or efficient means of
motivating or disciplining managers").
13. Scholars discussing the nature and role of institutional shareholders
amid the current corporate law landscape include Bernard S. Black, Share-
holder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus ControL" The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLuM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Inves-
tor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988); Matheson & Olson, supra
note 6; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institu-
tional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); A.A. Sommer, Corporate
Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 357
(1990).
14. Several scholars have attempted to describe the nature and character
of the current governance regime. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schi-
pani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs,
1318 [Vol. 76:1313
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none have proffered a model procedural governance framework
as proposed in this Article.
Corporate law has developed dialectically in four stages. In
the current "insulated managerialism" stage of corporate law,15
institutional shareholders lack an incentive to invest in a corpo-
ration for the long term. They currently lack the opportunity
to offer meaningful guidance on fundamental corporate affairs
and major longterm financial strategies.'6 Piecemeal reform
efforts cannot address the core weakness in the current frame-
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989); Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of
Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle & Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19
(1988); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the
Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 881; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Cor-
porate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982) [hereinafter Fis-
chel, The Corporate Governance Movement]; Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited. Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Cor-
poration Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom'; Upton, Target's Boardroom, supra note 6; Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 12; Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section
2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984); Elliott J. Weiss
& Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Inves-
tors'Reaction to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551 (1987); Elli-
ott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALl Corporate
Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1984).
As to the nature and function of corporate law generally, see AMERICAN
LAW INSTrrUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft) (March 31, 1992) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Final Draft]; CLARK, supra note 6; CORPORATIONS AND SOCmTy: POWER
AND RESPONSIBILITY (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987); Ber-
nard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and
the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865 (1990).
15. See infra part I.D.
16. [O]wning stock and not being able to assert your ownership rights
is like owning a piece of land over which you have little control. If
you can't walk on it, garden it, put a fence around it, or build on it, it
isn't worth much. If American corporations are owned by stockhold-
ers who can't assert their ownership rights eventually the ownership
may not be worth much either.... I believe that a number of steps
must be taken to reinforce the rights of shareholders or they will be
completely disenfranchised.
First, institutions must act like the permanent owners of the busi-
nesses in which they [invest]....
Second, institutional investors should put pressure on directors to
be more responsive to shareholder concerns about longterm strategies
and the productive use of corporate assets....
Letter from Edward C. Johnson to Fidelity shareholders (Apr. 3, 1990), in
MONKS & MINOW, supra note 1, at 204-05.
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work of corporate governance-that modern institutional
shareholders lack both the incentives and legal base to invest in
a corporation for the long term.17
This Article proposes to harness fundamental principles of
corporate governance' s to develop an innovative governance
framework responsive to the evolving nature of modern institu-
tional shareholders and boards of directors. The focus of this
17. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at 525. Black explains:
The way to see if shareholder voting can matter is to change the legal
rules that obstruct individual and collective shareholder action ....
Piecemeal change, though, such as recent proposals to reform the
proxy rules, has only limited promise. There are many obstacles to
shareholder voice, and their burden is cumulative. Changing only the
proxy rules won't have dramatic results.
Id.; see also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 203, 213 ("Our rules of cor-
porate governance require the sort of fundamental reform that will align the
interests of all corporate constituents toward the long ter..... Any reform
... must be part of a larger effort to reorient stockholders toward a long-term
perspective."); Weiss, supra note 14, at 3 (arguing that reform "must constitute
a comprehensive and internally consistent set of rules for corporate
governance").
18. Professor Elliott J. Weiss has enumerated seven widely accepted pro-
positions which "serve as premises on which a system of rules for the govern-
ance of publicly held corporations should be based":
[I1-The corporate form of organization provides suppliers of capital
("shareholders") and suppliers of entrepreneurial skills ("managers")
with a potentially efficient vehicle for pursuing economic gain.
[2--Shareholders and managers have a joint interest in enhancing
corporate profits....
[3J-Despite shareholders' and managers' shared interest in enhanc-
ing corporate profits, managers inevitably will make some decisions
that result in losses....
[4]-[Mjanagers' interests [sometimes] conflict with those of share-
holders and some managers will choose to impose "agency costs" on
their corporations....
[5]-Shareholders can take a number of actions to protect themselves
against the impact of agency costs [including portfolio diversification,
discounting or selling their stock, or] voic[ing] their dissatisfaction by
voting to elect new managers or by suing to remedy breaches of fidu-
ciary duty. Because exit is cheap and "voice" is often expensive, inef-
fective, or both, most shareholders will favor exit.
[6]-The "voice" mechanisms remain significant in two contexts.
First, new shareholders prepared to buy a substantial portion of a cor-
poration's stock or existing shareholders prepared to finance a proxy
contest can use shareholder voting rights to replace inept or self-ag-
grandizing managers. Second, (shareholders] can use derivative suits
to police managers' breaches of their fiduciary duties....
[7-Outside, or nonmanagement, directors have the potential to mon-
itor managers' performance more efficiently than shareholders ....
Outside directors are not always effective monitors, though, and there
is little evidence that corporations with boards consisting primarily of
outside directors are more profitable or more highly valued by inves-
tors than other corporations.
Weiss, supra note 14, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 76:13131320
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model framework is the process by which corporate governance
powers are allocated. Rather than setting out substantive rules
fixing the respective duties and powers of shareholders and
nonshareholders, the proposed model establishes a process by
which governance issues are resolved.
Such a "process approach" offers many advantages. First, a
procedural framework can remain viable amid a dynamic cor-
porate law landscape. Second, although most institutional in-
vestors cannot monitor the hundreds of companies within their
portfolio, they can monitor particularly important events and
issues in those companies. Indeed, focusing upon significant is-
sues common to all corporations obviates the need for longterm
shareholders to engage in firm-specific monitoring. The in-
creased economies of scale afforded by this procedural focus
will fuel longterm shareholders' incentives to improve underly-
ing corporate performance and profitability.' 9 The proposed
procedural governance framework ensures that the directors
will seek input from longterm shareholders whenever funda-
mental changes in the corporation's governance regime are pro-
posed. Third, a procedural corporate law regime may be the
inevitable result of the forces currently shaping corporate law.
In particular, such a structure is the logical result of the "nexus
of contracts" perspective of corporate law.20
Process-oriented reform should squarely address the cir-
cumstances under which shareholders should or must be al-
lowed to guide directors' or managers' business judgment.
Longterm shareholders must be allowed to do so when either
or both of two factors exist: when conflicts of interest between
shareholders and nonshareholders substantially blur a board's
ability to determine an appropriate course of action objectively
and efficiently, or when the decision facing a director will have
such an impact upon the shareholders' financial investment
that shareholders possess significant incentives to determine
the course that will maximize longterm shareholder/corporate
value.
Shareholders' procedural involvement may appear through
several mechanisms, including shareholder voting and share-
holder advisory committees. Fully implemented, this proposal
would enable the board to perform the function it is best suited
19. See Black, supra note 8, at 834-38 (noting that "shareholders have
stronger incentives to take an active interest on issues for which scale econo-
mies [exist]").
20. See infra part IM.A. (discussing the "process approach").
1992] 1321
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to perform: to be an effective central mediator between long-
term shareholders and longterm stakeholders. Under the pro-
posal, the board would also seek the advice of major longterm
shareholders on significant financial matters, in addition to
seeking the counsel already provided by management and long-
term stakeholders.
The longterm economic efficiency that this model gener-
ates should be self-propagating. Sophisticated shareholders will
invest only in those corporations with responsive management.
This fosters cooperation. Corporate management will be forced
to consider the desires of major longterm shareholders.21 Cor-
porations that acknowledge major longterm shareholders' gov-
ernance desires will have share prices that reflect greater
shareholder satisfaction, and ultimately will be able to attract
the patient capital essential for longterm success. 22
This Article suggests a process by which longterm share-
holders may meaningfully influence corporate governance.
Part I describes the development of the current governance re-
gime as framed by practices, legislation, and case law. Corpo-
rate law has evolved in four stages, from shareholder primacy
to managerial capitalism, and then from management monitor-
ing to the current situation, flourishing insulated managerial-
ism. Consequently, the current governance framework is
inconsistent with the ascendancy of the institutional investor.
Part II describes the potency of the escalating conflict between
shareholders and nonshareholders and examines current re-
form proposals. This Part argues that institutional investors
lack an effective means of involvement in governance issues
and thereby lack the incentive to view their holdings as long-
term investments.
Accordingly, Part III of this Article sets out a model frame-
work of corporate governance based on the assimilation of the
institutional investor as the quintessential longterm share-
holder. This part proposes recognizing the role and right of the
"longterm shareholder" as a means toward reducing this share-
holder/nonshareholder tension. The purpose is to promote co-
21. See Institutional Voting Research Service Client Advisory Letter (May
1990) [hereinafter May 1990 Client Advisory Letter], in INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TORS, supra note 3, at 25, 25 (asserting that "shareholders are developing a
memory, and will in the future penalize boards who have in the past acted in a
way that ignores shareholder preferences").
22. See Howard D. Sherman, Special Report: The 1990 Proxy Season (In-
stitutional Shareholder Serv., Inc., Aug. 10, 1990), in INSTITUTIONAL INvEs-
TORS, supra note 3, at 297, 300.
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operation, thereby easing the conflicts between shareholders
and nonshareholders that have escalated with the rise of the in-
stitutional investor, and to provide a process by which share-
holder interests are represented effectively. Moreover, since
meaningful reform must ultimately be ground in specific statu-
tory language, this Article proposes model statutory provisions
that are consistent with the role of the longterm shareholder in
corporate governance. Part IV of the Article explores the na-
ture and destiny of the "longterm shareholder" governance
regime.
I. THE DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
The relationship between shareholders and nonsharehold-
ers in the operation of the modern public corporation appears
to have a dialectical character: as the power of one expands,
the power of the other diminishes; the strength of the one often
causes the other to react to expand its power. Thus, commenta-
tors often view shareholder and nonshareholder interests as op-
posing and mutually exclusive. Modern shareholders, they
argue, typically seek short-term profit while nonshareholders
typically seek longterm protection.23 The American Law Insti-
tute Corporate Governance Project describes the dialectical na-
ture of tensions between shareholders and one nonshareholder
group, management, as endemic to corporate governance:
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of a
corporate structure that allows management the discretion to utilize
its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time establish
safeguards in situations in which management might utilize that dis-
cretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders. 24
23. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 214-15.
24. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, introductory note to part VI, at
519; see also id introductory note to parts III & HI-A, at 99 (noting that there
are "two highly important social needs regarding [publicly held] corporations[:]
the need to permit a corporation to be highly flexible in structuring its opera-
tional management [and] the need for processes that ensure managerial ac-
countability to shareholders"). Building upon this dichotomy, Professor
Lyman Johnson asserts that the function of corporate law
should [be to] confer a sufficiently wide berth of discretion to enable
management to operate creatively and flexibly but should not be so
broad that management can subvert the ultimate objective of share-
holder welfare. These dual strands of management discretion and
shareholder welfare are in constant tension, and each is poised on any
given issue to check, if not negate and overwhelm, the other.
Johnson, supra note 14, at 880 (footnote omitted). Dean Robert Clark has also
argued that
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The tensions seemingly inherent in the modern public cor-
poration have more or less evolved dialectically over time.a
the role or function of the manager is to act on behalf of other per-
sons' interests. Yet power corrupts. It can be turned to [a manager's]
personal use... in ways that hurt the other persons having claims on
the organization. The problem, then, is how to keep managers ac-
countable to their other-directed duties while nonetheless allowing
them great discretionary power over appropriate matters. This is the
major problem dealt with by corporate law.
CLARK, supra note 6, § 1.5, at 33-34.
25. Although we do not attempt to describe the dialectical development of
corporate law in philosophical terms, we recognize that philosophical princi-
ples of the "dialectic" have fueled efforts to describe the nature and evolution
of social and economic phenomenon. Telescoping our general proposition be-
yond the corporate law domain, we suggest that whenever the relation be-
tween two classes or categories of individuals or entities has an intrinsically
dialectical character, the evolution of their relationship shall proceed dialecti-
cally. Put differently, the nature of a thing (i.e., a dialectical relationship be-
tween two forces) compels the destiny of a thing (i.e., a dialectical progression
and expression of those forces).
The proposition that certain social phenomenon evolve dialectically has
been most forcefully articulated by the philosophers G.W.F. Hegel and Karl
Marx. See generally Joseph McCarney, Hegel, Marx, and Dialectic, in HEGEL
AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 161 (David Lamb ed., 1987). Together, Hegel and
Marx have established the significance of the dialectic for social science
inquiry:
The concept's moving principle, which alike engenders and dissolves
the particularizations of the universal, I call "dialectic" .... The...
dialectic of the concept consists not simply in producing the determi-
nation as a contrary and a restriction, but in producing and seizing
upon the positive content and outcome of the determination, because
it is this which makes it solely a development and an immanent pro-
gress. Moreover, this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking
applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul
putting forth its branches and fruit organically. This development of
the Idea is the proper activity of its rationality, and thinking, as some-
thing subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part adding to it
any ingredient of its own. To consider a thing rationally means not to
bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper
with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account; here
it is mind in its freedom, the culmination of self-conscious reason,
which gives itself actuality and engenders itself as an existing world.
G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 34-35 (T.M. Knox trans., Ox-
ford University 1952) (1821).
Marx credits Hegel for pioneering the concept of the dialectic. Hegel's
Phenomenology of Mind is a pivotal work for the Hegel-Marx nexus: it is for
Marx "the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy."
KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHMOSOPHIC MANUSCmPs OF 1844, at 146 (1961).
Marx argues that Hegel's dialectic "in its rational form" is "revolutionary."
KARL MARx, 1 CAPITAL 103 (Penguin Books 1976) (1886).
Class conflict is the focus of Marx's dialectic. Marx's subject for dialecti-
cal inquiry (his "subjective" dialectic) is the social class, and in Marx's version
of the phenomenological dialectic, the opposition of ruling ideas conflict and
are refuted by reason. The primary "objective" dialectical opposition for Marx
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This evolution has occurred in four stages.26 The power strug-
gle between shareholders and nonshareholders is the fuel pro-
pelling this dialectical evolution.2
In the first stage, marking the early years of modern corpo-
rate law, shareholder primacy was the norm. Shareholders had
the right and power to control the operation of the corporation.
As corporations grew and capital markets expanded, sharehold-
ers typically became more passive, relying on corporate man-
agement to run the business in the best interests of
shareholders. As the gulf between shareholders and other cor-
porate constituencies (including management) widened, corpo-
rate theorists proposed that management be monitored to
is that of labor and capital. This tension derives from a network of antagonis-
tic class relationships which express themselves in opposing beliefs, purposes,
and practices. For Marx, "the conflict of the classes can only be transcended
by a transition to a new age if the historical process becomes conscious for...
the proletariat." McCarney, supra, at 175.
Hegel and Marx believed that the historical evolution of dialectical ten-
sions is a rational process. "[Tihe only thought which philosophy brings with
it is the simple idea of reason-the idea that reason governs the world, and
that world history is therefore a rational process." G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HisTORy 27 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge
University Press 1975) (1830) (emphasis added). Marx views the historical de-
velopment of the social economy as the dialectical progression of forces and
relations of production.
At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of produc-
tion in society come in conflict with the existing relations of produc-
tion .... From forms of development of the forces of production
these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social
revolution.
KARL MARx, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRTQUE OF POLrncAL ECONOMY 12
(N.I. Stone, Trans., Int'l Lib. Pub. Co., 1904) (1859). In this way, a bourgeois
revolution catalyzed the transition from feudalism to capitalism; the replace-
ment of capitalism by socialism would in turn result from a proletarian revolu-
tion.
We suggest that corporate law has more or less proceeded in dialectical
stages. The seeds of this dialectical progression take objective foothold in the
ownership/control dichotomy intrinsic to the corporate form. As one strand of
the shareholder/manager dialectic expands its power, the other reacts to fur-
ther entrench its power. The development of corporate governance has mir-
rored this intrinsic dialectical tension. The subjective manifestation of this
dialectical tension is discussed in the remainder of Part I.
26. Cf. Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on
Investment Management Trustees, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 562-67 (1981) (sug-
gesting that the history of capitalism embodies four stages: the age of the en-
trepreneur, the age of the professional business manager, the age of the
portfolio manager, and the age of the savings planner).
27. Unlike the evolution of capitalism as depicted by Dean Robert Clark,
see supra note 26, the evolution of corporate law has not been motivated by
efficiency advantages; rather, the essence of the evolution has been the power
struggle resulting from the shareholder/nonshareholder duality.
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secure shareholders' interests. Legal monitoring devices, such
as the independent director, were proposed and often adopted.
The market for corporate control also evolved as a potent moni-
toring device. In response, nonshareholders aggressively devel-
oped protective mechanisms, culminating in the insulated
managerialism of the current period.
A fifth stage of corporate development appears inevitable:
the "longterm shareholder" stage. As shall become apparent,
the longterm shareholder stage is a synthesis of several aspects
of corporate development. It reconciles shareholder welfare on
the one hand with longterm corporate welfare on the other.
This longterm shareholder stage of corporate law harnesses the
incentives of shareholders seeking to maximize their longterm
wealth while collaterally advancing the longterm interests of
nonshareholders and society.
A. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NoRM
Despite the fundamental importance of defining the goals
of corporate law, no corporate code attempts to address its pur-
pose or function.28 Recent scholarship on corporate governance
demonstrates how governance goals are ill-defined. 29 Perhaps
the fundamental goal of corporate law is so theoretically and
historically obvious that it need not be explicated:30 the goal is
to maximize corporate-and thus shareholder-welfare. 3' At
28. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 523 (stating that "corporate statutes
... do not specify the purpose of the corporation"); Johnson, supra note 14, at
874 (asserting that "not a single corporate statute explicitly addresses the pur-
pose of corporate activity"). Still, many business corporation statutes and the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act define "corporation" to mean a cor-
poration for profit. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 102(a)(4) (McKinney
1986); REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 1.404 (1984).
29. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 187 ("In much of the recent
academic literature on corporate governance .... the goals are either ill-de-
fined or assumed without examination.").
30. "Every business manager 'knows' what corporations are all about-
corporations make money from their products or services ...... Schwartz,
supra note 14, at 514; see also Johnson, supra note 14, at 877-78 (arguing that
"most persons in this country probably would be astounded to hear that max-
imization of shareholder wealth is the raison d'etre of corporate existence, yet
the corporate doctrine takes that focus for granted").
31. More likely, legislators prefer to defer to scholars on the resolution of
the knotty question of the meaning of corporate law. Although many possible
goals of corporate endeavors have emerged, maximizing shareholder profits
(with various exceptions, such as charitable donations) is the most established:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
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least this is the notion with which the law of corporations and
the principles of corporate governance began.
The traditional shareholder primacy model of the corpora-
tion derives from the concept that the shareholders are the
owners of the corporation and, as such, are entitled to control
it, determine its fundamental policies, and decide whether to
make fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice. This
system of corporate governance developed its essential attrib-
utes when "owners managed and managers owned."32 There
were few institutional investors and the shares of most corpora-
tions were owned by individual investors who were typically
founders or local investors. 33 Other potential corporate constit-
uencies took their place after and only to the extent the share-
holders determined, by contract or conscience, to be so bound.
The viability of this model derives from economic common
sense. Only shareholders have strong incentives to maximize
profits,4 thereby promoting economic efficiency.35
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.... []t is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose
of benefiting others ....
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
Other goals of corporate law include maximizing longterm corporate wel-
fare, maximizing the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, various
economic goals, and various political goals (where the law should compel the
corporation to pursue social goals that benefit society). See Schwartz, supra
note 14, at 524-26. For a description of the "political model" of the corporation,
see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct and Governance-
Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 3 (1983).
32. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMEmcAN BusINEss 9-10 (1977).
33. See Lipton, supra note 7, at 64.
34. Because of the separation of ownership and control in modern corpo-
rations, management does not have the incentive to exert itself beyond the de-
gree needed to "maintain a reasonably satisfied group of stockholders."
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 301 (rev. ed. 1967). Shareholders, however, are not simi-
larly constrained. Id. at 299-302.
35. See CLARK, supra note 6, § 9.5, at 389. Clark has explained:
From an economic point of view, there is a strong argument that the
power to control a business firm's activities should reside in those
who have the right to the firm's residual earnings .... The intuition
behind this argument is that giving control to the residual claimants
will place the power to monitor the performance of participants in
the firm and the power to control shirking, waste, and so forth in the
hands of those who have the best incentive to use the power.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
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The shareholder vote traditionally has been seen as an im-
portant mechanism for shareholder control over corporate deci-
sions.36 Shareholders vote to elect and remove directors.31 The
board in turn designates officers to act as agents of the corpora-
tion.38 In addition, fundamental corporate transactions require
shareholder approval. For example, shareholders normally
must vote on mergers,3 9 dissolutions,40 or sales of substantially
all of a corporation's assets.41 Within this model, however, the
board is presumed to act as a surrogate for and in the interests
of the shareholders.
Justifications given for shareholders' primary voice in the
governance of corporate affairs distill to one concept: Share-
holders are well-suited to guide and discipline directors and
managers. Shareholder guidance is the focal point for two
reasons.
First, directors need guidance relating to corporate matters
that raise potential conflicts of interest between shareholders
and nonshareholders. As the potential for conflicts of interest
escalates, the likelihood that directors' business judgment will
be biased against longterm shareholder interests intensifies. At
a minimum, lack of shareholder input amid such conflict of in-
terest adds to the uncertainties that directors face in determin-
ing an optimal course for longterm shareholders.4
Accordingly, as the potential for conflicts of interest increases,
the need for shareholder input similarly rises.
Conflicts appear in numerous corporate transactions in-
cluding executive compensation and the dismissal of share-
holder derivative suits. Such conflicts of interest, however,
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777,
787-88 (1972) (explaining the nature of the control exerted by residual claim-
ants over management).
36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1990).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991).
38. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1 (1976).
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991).
40. See, e.g., id. § 275.
41. See, e.g., id. § 271.
42. [T]he inevitable uncertainties with respect to application of the
business judgment rule in particular situations... ha[s] contributed to
an atmosphere of uncertainty about the protection afforded directors
as they act in good faith to meet their responsibilities. [For example,]
[s]uch uncertainty could force directors to act defensively out of con-
cern over costly personal litigation rather than in directing and man-
aging the business of the corporation.
R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director
Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 8 (1987).
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reach peak proportions in takeover scenarios. 43 Economists ad-
dressing takeovers tend to adhere to either the market effi-
ciency position" or the auction market position,45 both of
which place shareholders in a preeminent status. A share-
holder primacy model envisions that directors adopting an-
titakeover measures will objectively consider the manifold
alternatives to maximizing corporate profits, implementing de-
fensive measures primarily to limit inadequate or coercive bids
or develop superior bids or restructuring plans.
4 6
Second, shareholders are the optimal source of this gui-
dance. Shareholders alone possess unimpeded incentives to
maximize share value.47 By maximizing longterm economic ef-
ficiency, shareholders and nonshareholders benefit simultane-
ously. 48 Directors, lacking such incentives while saddled with
conflicting, economically inefficient prejudices, 49 may fail to
search out optimal alternatives unless guided by shareholders.
43. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1484.
44. Under the market efficiency theory, managers shield themselves be-
hind antitakeover devices without having proper accountability to sharehold-
ers, thus usurping market power while stripping themselves of the incentive to
run a more efficient corporation. Proponents of this view argue that tender
offers help monitor target management performance. Thus, takeovers maxi-
mize efficiency either by allowing suboptimal directors and managers to be
taken over or by motivating directors to run the corporation more efficiently;
essentially, the "market" monitors managerial performance while sharehold-
ers hold management accountable for profit performance. Further, this en-
hanced efficiency generates more wealth for both shareholders and
nonshareholder constituencies. Under this theory directors should remain
"passive" amid control change transactions. See Matheson & Olson, supra
note 6, at 1493-94.
45. A more moderate approach focuses on the use of defensive antitake-
over weaponry, such as poison pills, to facilitate an auction market amid hos-
tile overtures. While the existence of an auction market will generate greater
premiums for shareholders, of more significance is the fact that such a market
will maximize the likelihood of assuring the most productive match among
raider and target. This optimal "match" maximizes longterm economic effi-
ciency. Delaware courts have traditionally embraced the modified "auction
model" for corporate control. See id- at 1494-95.
46. See John H. Matheson & Jon R. Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions
and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activi-
ties, 47 U. PrIT. L. REV. 407, 409-10 (1986) (explaining development of antitake-
over measures); Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1437-38 (describing
corporate management's response to takeover attempts and the goals of such
activity).
47. See BERLE & MEANs, supra note 34, at 301.
48. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1491.
49. See id at 1483-87 (explaining directors' conflict of interest).
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B. MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM AND LONGTERM CORPORATE
WELFARE
Whether or not theoretically sound, the reign of the eco-
nomic-based shareholder primacy concept of corporate govern-
ance was short-lived. Stressing separation of ownership from
control as the most important factor in modern corporate gov-
ernance, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means questioned the real-
ity of "shareholder primacy" in 1932 in their classic work, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.50 They claimed
that shareholders were merely passive owners; managers pro-
vided the true locus of control amid pervasive shareholder pas-
sivity. Berle and Means asserted that, in an increasing number
of large companies, management was not chosen by sharehold-
ers but rather was a self-perpetuating oligarchy.51 Management
controlled the director nomination process and the proxy
machinery.52
With this provocative background, debate over the proper
corporate objective and the propriety of managers' diverging
from the goal of profit maximization has raged without repose.
In the early 1930s, Berle and Professor E. Merrick Dodd de-
bated the scope of management's responsibility. Berle asserted
that, based on fiduciary duties owed shareholders, "powers
granted to a corporation.., are necessarily and at all times ex-
ercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders. '53
Dodd countered that public policy demands that a corporation
be "an economic institution which has a social service as well as
50. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 34, at 244.
51. I& at 124; see Dent, supra note 14, at 907.
52. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 34, at 124; see also Dent, supra note 14, at
882 ("So long as management controls proxies, corporate governance reform
efforts are doomed."). Dent also explains:
[I]f shareholders are supposed to select directors, it is incongruous to
vest proxy control in incumbents seeking re-election. This is like let-
ting legislators fund their re-election campaigns from the public treas-
ury while requiring challengers to pay their own way. This system
makes the board a self-perpetuating oligarchy and, once management
controls the board, the tool for managerial control of the firm. In
short, the system generates the separation of ownership and control.
Id at 906-07; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 419-20 (1983) (stating that "shareholders'
involvement in the voting process has not increased with the adoption of the
proxy rules").
53. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931).
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a profit-making function."' This debate demarcated the initial
boundaries between a fiduciary shareholder primacy norm and
a longterm corporate welfare norm.5
The potential separation of ownership and control en-
hances the likelihood that those controlling the corporation
will lack an incentive to maximize efficiency and shareholder
profitability because of pressures to diverge from the interests
of shareholders. With the separation of ownership from control
also came the potential for managers to pursue their own self-
interested agendas more aggressively within the corporate
framework. When directors face claims for consideration from
multiple interests or are self-interested,5 6 shareholders cannot
rely fully upon the directors' business judgment. This leaves
the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders in disarray.5 7
Delaware law, for example, provides that either the disin-
terested board members, the shareholders, or the courts may
validate a transaction in which managers' interests clearly di-
verge from those of shareholders.5 8 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.5 9
54. E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932).
55. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 521.
56. This conflict between duty and self interest arises either when direc-
tors stand on both sides of a transaction or when they may otherwise reap
some personal benefit from their actions.
57. See John C. Carter, To Whom is a Corporate Director a Fiduciary?,
NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1987, at 21, 22; see also Dodd, supra note 54, at 1149 (argu-
ing that corporate boards should act as trustees for numerous constituencies);
Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LaCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Con-
trol Transactions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAw. 29, 38-44
(1986) (describing current judicial concern with the due care exercised by cor-
porate boards).
For example, courts generally hold that during a takeover attempt a tar-
get board breaches its fiduciary duty only when its antitakeover tactics are mo-
tivated "solely or primarily" to perpetuate control of the corporation. E.g.,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (finding that "de-
fensive" acquisitions do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty unless fend-
ing off a merger was the sole reason for the acquisitions), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 378 (2d Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that "a director does not necessarily breach any duty owed to the corpora-
tion by promoting a change of management"). However, with few exceptions,
directors have successfully demonstrated that they were at least partially mo-
tivated by legitimate corporate concerns. See Gary G. Lynch & Marc I. Stein-
berg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 901, 926 (1979) (stating that "management can easily manufacture a 'legit-
imate' corporate purpose"). But see, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that an employee stock option
plan (ESOP) was created "solely as a tool of management self-perpetration,"
and therefore was not legitimate).
58. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Merritt v. Colo-
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developed the modern formula for judicial review of transac-
tions involving conflicts of interest. Weinberger held that "di-
rectors . .. [who] are on both sides of a transaction .. . are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain."60
But the types of conflicts and self-interested actions engen-
dered by managerial capitalism typically do not call into play
this strict standard of review. Rather, such conflicts are more
subtle. For example, the pursuit of longterm stability, the rein-
vestment of earnings, and the growth and diversification of the
corporate business tends to solidify the corporate enterprise
and maintain managers in their positions. From this perspec-
tive, current earnings and profits may take on secondary
importance.6 '
As the nature of the corporation changed, so did the nature
of corporate law. Corporate codes became "enabling," thereby
presumptively allowing contracting parties (i.e., managers and
investors) much flexibility to determine the terms of the corpo-
rate charter and to establish corporate governance regimes free
from most legal intervention.62
To be effective tools for efficient contracting, these en-
abling corporate codes presume the ability of contracting par-
ties to make their wishes known. Despite the original
conception of the corporation, in which the theoretical (or sub-
sequent) shareholders exercised primary control, modern cor-
porate codes developed their essential character when "[e]ach
shareholder owned few shares and lacked the means or inclina-
tion to participate actively [in corporate matters]."63 The sepa-
ration of ownership from control and the concomitant ability of
managers to control the proxy process therefore leaves owners
without traditional control or the ability to negotiate effectively
nial Foods, 505 A.2d 757, 764 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144(a) (1991) (noting the presumptive validity of transactions approved by
disinterested directors or shareholders).
59. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
60. Id, at 710.
61. As to these actions, strict judicial scrutiny does not come into play.
Rather, the courts apply the hands-off business judgment rule to directors' in-
formed decisions, erecting a presumption of good faith, thereby barring legal
intervention which might substitute judicial judgment for those actions pre-
sumptively best left to managers. See infra part I.D.3 (noting the growing ju-
dicial deference to board decisions).
62. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1417 (1989).
63. Dent, supra note 14, at 883.
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with management. The resulting loss in efficiency and the ex-
pense in designing alternative means to control management
discretion have been aptly described as "agency costs."'
Theoretically, then, Berle and Means also foreshadowed
the arrival of a competing school of thought, the "longterm cor-
porate welfare" model,65 which posits that managers should
seek to maximize longterm corporate health irrespective of ef-
fects on short-term shareholder wealth.66 Accordingly, under
case law and developing modem statutes, directors may con-
sider nonshareholder interests in arriving at longterm business
strategies, including the interests of employees, creditors, com-
munities, customers, and suppliers. 67
C. MONITORING MANAGEMENT
Most current reform proposals proceed from the some-
times unstated premise that governance reforms would be un-
necessary but for the separation of ownership and control.68
That is, while there is dispute over the validity of the Berle and
Means thesis, commentators agree that potential conflicts of in-
terest between managers and shareholders are omnipresent.69
Thus, one great challenge of corporate law is to minimize
agency costs by constraining abuse of managerial discretion.
Agency costs stemming from the ownership/control dichot-
omy may be minimized in a variety of ways. First, corporate
law imposes liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. These
64. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
293 (1988).
65. See BE= & MEANS, supra note 34, at 312; Adolf A. Berle, For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1932).
But see Dodd, supra note 54, at 1149 (stating that "business is permitted and
encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to the community
rather than because it is a source of profits to its owners"); E. Merrick Dodd,
Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Prac-
ticable?, 2 U. CH. L. REv. 194 (1934).
66. The chief proponent of this model is Martin Lipton. See, e.g., Lipton
& Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 189 ("[The ultimate goal of corporate govern-
ance is the creation of a healthy economy through the development of business
operations that operate for the long term and compete successfully in the
world economy.").
67. Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1469-70.
68. See Dallas, supra note 14, at 22.
69. Stressing the central importance of conflicting interests for corporate
law, Dean Robert Clark has noted that "[tJhe overwhelming majority of par-
ticular rules, doctrines and cases in corporate law are simply an explication of
[the duty of loyalty] or of the procedural rules and institutional arrangements
involved in implementing iL" CLARK, supra note 6, § 1.5, at 34.
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rules historically have operated on the assumption that the cor-
poration should be managed primarily to maximize shareholder
interests.
Fiduciary principles constrain managerial discretion by
governing the web of agency relationships constituting the cor-
porate structure.7 0 Charged with managing the corporation,71 a
director owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders to act in their
best interests.7 2 This duty of care is circumscribed by the busi-
ness judgment rule, the common law "presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief
that the action was in the best interests of the company."
73
Consistent with the business judgment rule, liability will not
attach for breach of the duty of care unless the director acted
with gross negligence.7 4 Courts have carved out two limitations
to application of the rule: first, there cannot be a breach of the
duty of loyalty;75 second, directors must fulfill their duty to in-
form themselves of all material information reasonably avail-
able before making the decision.7 6
In addition to the fiduciary duties, there has been a push by
regulatory authorities and, to some extent, shareholders, to re-
quire that corporations have some independent directors on
their boards. The purpose for this requirement is the presump-
70. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra
note 6, at 700 ("The entire corporate structure is a web of agency relationships.
Investors delegate authority to directors, who subdelegate to upper managers,
and so on.").
71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business [of a
corporation] ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors . .. ").
72. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
273 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying a reasonable diligence standard); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("In carrying out their managerial roles,
directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and
its shareholders." (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff'd, 5
A.2d. 503 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939))).
73. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The business judg-
ment rule is a creation of common law. "There are no statutory formulations
of the business judgment rule." Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 4.01(c)
cmt., at 227. By invoking the business judgment rule, courts seek to avoid sec-
ond-guessing the merits of a business decision provided there is no evidence of
bad faith or self-dealing. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
74. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
75. Id at 812.
76. 1I Van Gorkom is the seminal case holding that before directors may
garner protection under the business judgment rule, a minimum level of care
as evinced by their gathering and reviewing pertinent information is required.
488 A.2d at 458-72.
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tion that such directors, independent of management, will mon-
itor management activities for the benefit of shareholders.
Much scholarship77 and case law78 adheres to this modified
form of the shareholder primacy model, which relies upon
monitoring mechanisms to limit managerial discretion in an ef-
fort to conform managerial conduct with the interests of share-
holders. Thus, according to this model, corporate law provides
the mechanisms to minimize agency costs by guaranteeing that
management will attempt to maximize shareholder value.
This discretion-constraining model of corporate governance
stresses that managers, inclined to pursue their own selfish mo-
tives, have intrinsic conflicts of interests with shareholders.79
Reconciling the shareholder primacy tenet with the Berle and
Means thesis, scholars endorsing this model assert that the law
must impose controls on management to ensure it is responsi-
ble to shareholders and the public.80
Managers and directors, however, are not inherently self-
interested-after all, most managers and directors diligently at-
tempt to maximize shareholder value.8' Furthermore, numer-
77. See, e.g., Louis LOWENsTEiN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET.
SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-18 (1988) (proposing
that in order to maximize shareholder participation in corporate governance,
institutional shareholders should nominate roughly 25% of the board); Gilson,
A Structural Approach, supra note 6, at 878-79 (proposing a rule that con-
strains management's ability to interfere with shareholders' tender offer deci-
sions). Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1191,
1201 (advocating managerial passivity amid takeovers to maximize shareholder
value) with Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1030 (advocating an auctioneering model
in which target managers solicit competing bids).
78. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that the primary criterion for judging the legality of poison
pills is "the goal of stockholder wealth maximization"), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 184 n.16 (Del. 1986) (explaining that the interests of
shareholders become the directors' sole concern when the corporation is for
sale); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.").
79. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1169-70
(stating that discipline serves to check management's tendency "to shirk re-
sponsibilities, consume perquisites, or otherwise take more than the corpora-
tion promised to give them"); Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 6, at
836 (unless checked, management will seek "to maximize their own welfare
rather than the shareholders' ").
80. See Elliott Goldstein, The Relationship Between the Model Corporation
Act and the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501, 501 (1984).
81. See JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 30 (1989).
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ous corporations provide managers with financial incentives to
maximize corporate profitability, thereby tending to align
shareholder and nonshareholder interests.8 2 The combined ef-
fect of these factors, together with the monitoring provided by
shareholders, supplies the strongest support for the claim that
monitoring mechanisms effectively minimize agency costs.
Market forces, like the market for corporate control, may
also constrain managerial abuses. At one extreme, this moni-
toring model views shareholders as owners of the corporation
and posits that ownership of stock is like ownership of any
other property.8 3 Unhappy shareholders can sell their shares to
others. At the least, such conduct should evidence their dis-
pleasure with management. If sold to a bidder in a tender of-
fer, such a sale might result in the ouster of management.
Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, this market in
corporate control acted as an important mechanism monitoring
corporate behavior.84
Consistent with the market monitoring model, some schol-
ars assert that corporate law should merely seek to facilitate
the operation of the market and reduce transaction costs.85
This market model posits that the corporation merely substi-
tutes for costly multiple contractual arrangements to increase
efficiency and maximize profits.8 6 Supporters of the market
model tend to ally themselves with the efficient capital market
hypothesis which decrees that, even when a change of control is
not threatened, stock prices accurately reflect all available in-
formation about the corporation, including the extent of agency
costs because of management-protecting behavior.8 7
The proponents of the market-monitoring model place sub-
82. Consider, for example, incentive/merit compensation tied to stock
value appreciation, earnings, or profit increases. See Upton & Rosenblum,
supra note 12, at 196-97.
83. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at
1191, 1201.
84. See, e.g., Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1435-38.
85. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 14,
at 1264-65; Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom," supra note 14, at 921; see also
RICHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW § 14.3, at 296 (2d ed. 1977)
(noting that the primary purpose of corporate law is to provide standard con-
tractual terms that facilitate the bargaining process).
86. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 523.
87. For a general overview of materials relevant to the efficient capital
market hypothesis, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 252-95
(2d ed. 1989); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 6, at 1734. In
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d
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stantial emphasis on the invisible hand of the marketplace.8 8
They stress that the optimal governance structure must derive
from experience rather than theory. Corporations persuading
shareholders that they offer the highest return will garner the
largest investments. Thus, only firms and managers making
choices which investors would ordinarily prefer will prosper
relative to other companies.8 9
Discretion-constraining rules are thus thought unnecessary
to the extent market forces sufficiently curb managerial discre-
tion.90 Economists claim that capital market discipline caused
by managers' incentive to sell stock for maximum value, labor
market discipline involving ex post evaluation of managers, and
product market discipline together adequately limit managerial
discretion.
The strength of this combined legal- and economic-based
modified shareholder primacy model of corporate governance is
uncertain. As discussed next, shareholders' ability to dislodge
entrenched management during ongoing control transactions
proved intolerable to nonshareholder forces. Nonshareholders
responded by devising ways to stultify shareholder input while
expanding director discretion. This has resulted in the "insu-
lated managerialism" norm of corporate governance.
D. INSULATED MALNAGERIALISM
While there is debate over the efficacy of internal and mar-
ket-monitoring mechanisms, including the hostile takeover,
there is no doubt that corporate management, the courts, and
state legislators responded to the perception, if not the reality,
of the concept of monitoring. In the middle to late 1980s, most
of the response came in decisions and statutes limiting the abil-
ity of potential acquirors to go directly to shareholders to gain
control of a target corporation.9 1 Statutes limiting or eliminat-
ing potential officer and director liability also provided insula-
1140 (Del. 1989), Chancellor Allen questioned the infallibility of the efficient
market hypothesis.
88. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 62, at 1419 ("Managers
may do their best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the
dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at
heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.").
89. See i&. at 1421.
90. See Black, supra note 13, at 578-79.
91. See infra part H.D.1 (describing business combination and control
share statutes).
13371992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion.92 Since management already controlled the proxy
machinery, giving management substantially more control over
the prospect and process of control transactions brought forth
an era of insulated managerialism.
1. Legislation Minimizing Market Monitoring and
Shareholder Input
Most public corporations are shielded by now-ubiquitous
state-imposed antitakeover legislation,93 which typically endows
management with the power to reject unwelcome takeover
overtures.94 These antitakeover provisions come in all shapes
and sizes, including fair price statutes, 95 disclosure statutes,96
92. See infra part II.D.2 (discussing legislation immunizing director
liability).
93. Johnson, supra note 14, at 909; Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at
1439 ("By January 1, 1991, at least 44 states had adopted antitakeover statutes
of some kind.").
94. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 10, at 468-69 (noting that all state statutes
"share the common feature of serving to consolidate the ability to respond to
tender offers in the hands of the incumbent managers of [target firms]").
95. Aimed at front-end loaded two-tiered offers, fair price statutes seek to
ensure that all target shareholders are offered and receive a "fair price" for all
shares-whether tendered during the "first tier" or "second tier"-unless the
offer is approved by a super-majority of noninterested shareholders. See
Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1445. Most fair price statutes are based on
Maryland's two-tier offer cash-out merger model. This model requires an "in-
terested shareholder" to satisfy the statute's fairness requirement-by offering
to the remaining minority the highest price paid any other shareholder before
the merger announcement. Failure to satisfy the fairness requirement triggers
a prohibitive super-majority statutory requirement: 80% of all the sharehold-
ers and two-thirds of all disinterested shareholders (i.e., shareholders other
than the bidder) must vote to approve a cash-out merger. MD. CoRPs. &
Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-602, 3-603 (1985).
96. Paralleling the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, these
statutes typically require disclosure of the suitor's source of funds, the restruc-
turing plans involving the target corporation, and the number of shares the
suitor owns directly (or as a beneficiary). As to the overall benefits to share-
holders of state-level disclosure statutes, the United States Supreme Court in
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), was
unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially enhances the share-
holders' position. The Illinois Act seeks to protect shareholders of a
company subject to a tender offer by requiring disclosures regarding
the offer, assuring that shareholders have adequate time to decide
whether to tender their shares, and according shareholders with-
drawal, proration, and equal consideration rights. However, the Wil-
liams Act provides these same substantive protections .... [Tihe
disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those man-
dated by the Williams Act ... may not substantially enhance the
shareholders' ability to make informed decisions .... [We] conclude
that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident security holders
are, for the most part, speculative.
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share rights plan endorsement statutes, 97 anti-greenail stat-
utes,98 and cashout/redemption rights statutes.99 Two antitake-
over statutes-the business combination statute and the control
share acquisition statute-overshadow the others. They
demonstrate how far legislatures have gone toward bolstering
the pro-management antitakeover landscape.
Legislatures often enact antitakeover statutes hastily, with-
out notice to or input from the public.10° As suggested by the
character and pervasiveness of the recent waves of antitakeover
legislation, 101 legislators do not consider shareholders a favored
Id. at 644-45.
97. These statutes explicitly authorize directors to implement discrimina-
tory poison pills. Most Shareholder Rights Plan Endorsement Statutes
(SRPES) allow directors to design poison pills which may include restrictions
or conditions that preclude or limit the exercise, transfer, or receipt of such
rights by any suitor, or invalidate such rights held by a suitor. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-35-1(f), 23-1-26-5 (Burns 1989); OHIo REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 1701.16, 1701.13(f)(7) (Baldwin 1989).
98. Anti-greenmail statutes attempt to eliminate abuses associated with a
target's payment of "greenmail," i.e., where the target repurchases, at a price
above its fair market value, its own stock held by an unwanted suitor. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 302A.553 (1990). These statutes generally prohibit a target from
purchasing, for more than fair market value, 3% or more of its own stock from
any shareholder who has held the shares for less than two years. Most stat-
utes provide that the restrictions do not apply if both the board and a majority
of shareholders approve the repurchase. See id.
99. Pennsylvania and Maine have enacted statutes which grant "appraisal
rights" to nontendering shareholders, entitling them to receive "fair value"
when the suitor acquires a threshold percentage of the target's shares. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 910 (Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2546,
2547 (Purdon Supp. 1991). Since the appraisal remedy may require payment of
a judicially determined "fair" price, it introduces into the bidding process
costly risks-the judge's determination of "fair value" will surely generate
much litigation; as risks increase, bids will be deterred. Although cashout stat-
utes grant shareholders the same protection as Maryland-type fair price stat-
utes, cashout statutes effectively require the bidder to acquire 100% percent of
the firm: their mandatory redemption procedures guarantee all shareholders
a fair price. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1451-52.
100. Romano, supra note 10, at 138-39; see P. John Kozyris, The Federal
Role in Corporate Takeovers: A Framework for a Limited Second Congres-
sional Intervention to Protect the Free Market, 51 OIo ST. L.J. 263, 263 (1990)
(arguing that despite the "unprecedented" transfer of power from the share-
holders to management, antitakeover legislation is "enacted without any sub-
stantive debate").
101. We have previously stated:
[A]ntitakeover statutes have been enacted in three waves. First-gen-
eration statutes were enacted in response to the spell of takeover ac-
tivity in the late 1960s, and often paralleled the requirements of the
Williams Act. Second-generation statutes were passed in response to
the Supreme Court's rejection of first-generation statutes announced
in Edgar v. MITE Corp. Third-generation statutes are those that have
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constituency. Since shareholders are rarely concentrated lo-
cally, their interests are systematically under-represented. 0 2
Further, since the expected gains of local nonshareholder an-
titakeover forces generally exceed those of resident sharehold-
ers, nonshareholders have far more incentive to direct
resources toward supporting antitakeover legislation.1 0 3
What motivates states to enact antitakeover legislation?
Wary of raiders' tendencies to liquidate companies, close plants
and lay off workers, state legislators seek to protect home-
based businesses.1° 4 More specifically, the impetus likely de-
rives from two sources: the enacting state's desire to protect
nonshareholder constituencies,105 including managers who are
unable or unwilling to persuade shareholders of the value of in-
ternal defensive measures,l °6  and financial protectionism,
where states desire to retain and maximize tax-generating
been passed since CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, where
the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's second-generation statute.
Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1438-49 (footnotes omitted).
102. See Macey, supra note 10, at 488-89.
103. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover
and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 491, 501. Professor Davis notes
that "because the activities of the antitakeover interests tend to be more local,
these interests are more likely to be well-organized at the state level. Labor
unions and municipalities typically have statewide associations; institutional
investors do not." Id
104. See Alan E. Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-takeover Legislationm A
Broadminded New Approach to Corporation Law or "A Race to the Bottom"?,
1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 119, 126; Johnson & Millon, Williams Act, supra
note 10, at 1864 (noting that deterrence of takeovers, not "investor protection,"
is the state's primary motivation); cf. Macey, supra note 10, at 476 ("Manage-
rial self-interest remains the sole explanation for state anti-takeover legisla-
tion."). Garfield explains:
[A] study of takeover statutes suggests that these statutes are not em-
ployee protective but management protective. By attempting to stop
takeovers, the statutes serve only one purpose: to entrench current
management in power. Nothing in the legislation ties the hands of
current managers from engaging in the same dislocative conduct at-
tributed to acquirors. The legislators are simply hoping that by pro-
tecting current managers, they will perpetuate current management
policies, including the current deployment of corporate assets and
jobs.
Garfield, supra, at 126.
105. More than half the states have adopted provisions which expressly al-
low directors to consider nonshareholder interests in responding to takeover
bids. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1500-01, 1538 (identifying 29
states that have enacted some form of these statutes).
106. State antitakeover legislation is often adopted at the request of poten-
tial target corporations reluctant to propose the defenses embodied in the stat-
utes. IHi at 1501.
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resources.10 7
a. Bypassing Shareholder Input Regarding "Business
Combinations"
At least twenty-eight states have enacted business combi-
nation statutes that prohibit most business combinations L08 be-
tween a target corporation and an "interested" shareholder
absent prior board approval.'0 9 Allowing a board to decide uni-
laterally whether business combination legislation is applicable
grants the board ultimate power to determine whether to ac-
cept a tender offer. Most of these statutes render shareholders
wholly powerless to accept tender offers by guaranteeing that
no such offer will be brought to fruition without target board
approval.
For example, New York's law prohibits business combina-
tions between resident domestic corporations and a twenty per-
cent shareholder for five years absent prior board approval.110
Delaware modified New York's statute"'L by establishing a
three-year prohibition on any business combination between a
107. Justice Powell has stated.
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multina-
tional corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a few
States. When corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city and
State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality
from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Man-
agement personnel-many of whom have provided community leader-
ship-may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to
cultural, charitable, and educational life-both in terms of leadership
and financial support--also tend to diminish when there is a move of
corporate headquarters.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 & n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in
part).
108. "Business combination" is a comprehensive term including virtually
every conceivable type of fundamental change. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203(c)(3) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(5) (McKinney 1986).
109. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1521-29 (identifying 28 states).
110. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912 (McKinney 1986). The New York statute
prohibits both two-step bids and coercive two-tier bids. See Booth, supra note
10, at 1676. With two-tier bids, the bidder announces in advance that, once
control passes, the remaining shareholders will be cashed out at a lower price
than those who initially tendered in the first tier, coercing some shareholders
to tender for less than they otherwise would. Id The New York statute es-
sentially prohibits hostile takeovers if the suitor plans to change the target's
business significantly. Id
111. Delaware's statute is manifestly less restrictive than New York's-in-
deed, the Delaware statute is one of the mildest in the nation: it applies only
to suitors who acquire between 15% and 85% of a target's shares. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2), (c)(5) (1991); Booth, supra note 10, at 1675 n.148.
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Delaware corporation and an "interested" stockholder 1 2 ac-
quiring fifteen percent or more of the company unless the
board of directors gives prior approval. 1 3 Since the Delaware
law covers more corporations than any other,114 the business
combination statute is currently the most pervasive form of an-
titakeover legislation.
b. Minimizing Shareholder Input Regarding Voting Rights
for "Control Shares"
No less than twenty-seven states have enacted control
share statutes 1 5 which, following Indiana's lead, afford share-
holders the right to determine collectively whether bidders'
"control shares" accrue voting rights."16 Despite this pro-share-
112. "Interested Stockholders" are shareholders that possess 15% or more
of a corporation's voting stock. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (1991).
113. See id. § 203(a)(1). In addition to this prior board approval, the Dela-
ware statute provides two additional pathways for a suitor to circumvent the
three-year freeze. First, the suitor may override the freeze if the qualifying
transaction results in a suitor's owning at least 85% of the target stock. Id,
§ 203(a)(2). Second, the suitor may override the freeze if the business combi-
nation is approved by both the board and by two-thirds of the outstanding dis-
interested shares. Id. § 203(a)(3). The Delaware statute has withstood
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers, 683 F. Supp. 458 (D.
Del. 1988).
114. Fifty-six percent of the Fortune 500 firms are incorporated in Dela-
ware. Forty-five percent of the firms listed with the New York Stock Ex-
change have Delaware as their corporate home. Dale A. Oesterle, Delaware's
Takeovers Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and ho Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 879, 883-84 (1988).
115. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1533-37 (table identifying and
discussing statutes in 27 states).
116. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (Burns 1989). Indiana based its passive
law on the more restrictive Ohio Control Share Acquisition Statute. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1989). Ohio's control share law differs
from Indiana's law in one important way: the Ohio Act requires advance
shareholder approval for the bidder to purchase shares which lift its owner-
ship over the relevant thresholds (20%, 33%, and 50%). See Booth, supra note
10, at 1678 n.157. Also, the Ohio statute focuses on the stock itself (rather than
the voting rights of the stock) in requiring the approval of disinterested share-
holders. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A), (E) (Baldwin 1989).
Indiana's law prohibits the acquiror of 20% or more of the target's shares
from voting those shares unless a majority of noninterested shareholders grant
the acquiror voting rights. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns 1989). Indiana's
law requires additional noninterested shareholder votes when the acquiror at-
tains over one-third and one-half, respectively, of the total target's voting
power. Upon filing an "acquiring person statement" with the target, the ac-
quiror may request that a vote be held within 50 days. Upon failing to garner
adequate shareholder votes, the target may redeem the acquiror's shares at
fair market value; if acquirors prevail in the vote and subsequently acquire a
majority of the shares, dissenting shareholders may elect to be cashed out at
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holder appearance, the essential purpose of control share acqui-
sition statutes may be to endow the target board with the
power to dispose of tender offers. The powers granted directors
under these statutes are vast. They include the power to opt
into or out of statutory protection;117 the power to control the
timing of the shareholder meeting;" 8s the power to approve a
merger unilaterally, thereby bypassing the statute; 1 9 the power
to issue stock to a "white knight" without triggering the stat-
ute's provisions;120 and the power to engage in friendly control
transactions. 12 In addition, the requirement that a meeting
and vote be held causes significant delay and attendant costs for
the potential acquiror. More fundamentally, however, control
share statutes dramatically alter the corporate control terrain.
Instead of making an investment decision, that is, whether to
sell their shares, shareholders are asked to vote on the ac-
quiror's voting rights. Once again, this creates a proxy contest
in which management can influence shareholders or rely on
presumed passivity. Thus, although control share statutes in
theory grant shareholders a much needed voice in control
transactions,2 2 their ultimate effect is to grant directors one
more means of minimizing shareholder input.
The popularity of these statutes likely stems from the fact
that they are the only variety of protectionist legislation upheld
by the Supreme Court.ms As an antitakeover weapon, armed
the highest price per share paid by the acquiror in her control share acquisi-
tion. See id.
117. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-5 (directors may unilaterally amend
bylaws, thereupon controlling election to opt in/out).
118. See, e.g., ic § 23-1-42-7(b).
119. Id § 23-1-42-2(d)(5) (acquisition of shares not deemed a control share
acquisition if pursuant to a plan of merger or plan share exchange).
120. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 38(e) (1990) (exempting shares
issued directly by the target corporation from the statute's coverage); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 reporter's notes.
121. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 110 D, § 1(c)(2)(vi) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
728.1(6) (Michie 1988).
122. Cf. Allen Boyer, When it Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No:
Commerce Clause and Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 539 (1988). Boyer hails control share statutes as
empowering shareholders to defeat or accept hostile offers, arguing that the
ultimate effect of control share statutes is to give shareholders a voice, provide
a mechanism for making this voice heard, and expand shareholders' role in
corporate governance. Id. at 539.
123. These statutes were believed to be pro-shareholder to the extent that
they allow shareholders to vote collectively, thereby mitigating coercion:
If, for example, shareholders believe that a successful tender offer
will be followed by a purchase of non-tendering shares at a depressed
price, individual shareholders may tender their shares - even if they
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with disinterested shareholder approval requirements and re-
demption and dissenters' rights, control share acquisition stat-
utes impose significant delays which may prove lethal to would
be suitors by increasing risks.124 As a result, potential acquirors
will be "extremely reluctant to acquire stock above any of the
[statutory] thresholds" lest they become permanently
disenfranchised.125
c. Bypassing Shareholder Input by Empowering Directors to
Consider Nonshareholder Interests
Many states have recently enacted legislation directly ex-
panding board discretion by mandating or allowing the boards
to consider constituencies other than shareholders. These stat-
utes potentially provide directors with much greater leeway in
rejecting tender offers than does current case law. 2 6 Typically,
these multiconstituency statutes explicitly allow individual di-
rectors to consider nonshareholder interests. One such statute,
recently passed in Minnesota, provides in pertinent part:
a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, sup-
pliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community
doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best interest - to pro-
tect themselves from being forced to sell their shares at a depressed
price .... [Thus], the shareholders as a group, acting in the corpora-
tion's best interest, could reject the offer, although individual share-
holders might be inclined to accept it.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987) (citing Two-Tier
Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Se. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,637 (June 21, 1984)).
124. "Delay has been characterized as 'the most potent weapon in a tender-
offer fight.'" Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637 n.12 (1982) (quoting
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 238 and citing Herbert M. Wachtell, Special
Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-42 (1977) and Diane
Wilner & Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and
Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1976)).
125. Thomas J. Andre, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Utility of Vote
Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 554 (1990);
cf. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Whether the control
shares statute 'protects shareholders of Indiana corporations' or protects in-
cumbent management seems to me a highly debatable question .... But a law
can be both economic folly and constitutional."). Indeed, Judge Posner consid-
ered these ex ante deterrences so powerful as to decry Indiana's statute as a
"lethal dose" for hostile takeovers. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'&L in part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
126. Commentators have asserted that these statutes "vest ... such ex-
traordinary broad discretion in a board" they probably affirm the "just say no"
defense. See MARTIN LIwrON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 5.03[1], at 5-34 (1991).
1344 [Vol. 76:1313
CORPORATE GOVERNVANCE
and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possi-
bility that these interests may be best served by the continued inde-
pendence of the corporation.=
2 7
The constituency statutes are consistent with a theory of
corporate law which posits that a corporation is essentially a
"nexus of contracts" in which numerous constituencies contract
with the corporation for protection and gain. Corporate control
is shared among numerous corporate constituencies; sharehold-
ers thus comprise only one component of this nexus.ms This
theory is based on the assumption that the firm is but a legal
fiction in which parties freely consummate contracts articulat-
ing the nature of their relationships' 29 and management takes
on the character of a central contracting agent.130
This shareholder contract derives from three sources: leg-
islation as interpreted by the courts,L3 ' articles of incorporation,
and fiduciary duties. 32 Unlike statutory standard terms, fiduci-
ary duties embody ex post evaluation of decisions rather than
defining the scope of directors' powers beforehand:as As such,
fiduciary duties fill gaps left by standard contract terms.1'
State statutes provide that most contractual terms may be
amended-typically by majority shareholder vote.135 Share-
holders initially investing in a corporation implicitly agree to
abide by majority-approved provisions. A threshold inquiry
into the province of corporate law thus involves examining the
extent to which governance terms should be determined
contractually. 13
6
127. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (1990). The effect of such legislation
is to "help shield directors from liability by expanding the criteria that direc-
tors may consider in reaching decisions on behalf of the corporation." LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 126, § 6.02[5], at 6-121.
128. See Dallas, supra note 14, at 23.
129. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 305.
130. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 35, at 777; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 64, at 310.
131. In this sense, corporate statutes provide standard form contractual
terms. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991) ('"his chapter and all amend-
ments thereof shall be part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of
every corporation.").
132. These duties may derive from either statute or case law. See, e.g., id
§ 144 (1991) (implied presumption that a transaction is voidable where director
is financially interested).
133. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 77.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991).
136. At one extreme, "[t]he law's role should be to interpret and enforce
[shareholders'] contracts." Ribstein, supra note 6, at 78.
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Shareholder primacy advocates argue that board considera-
tion of nonshareholder interests breeds inefficiency by dis-
torting the free flowing market allocation of resources and by
promoting arbitrary management decision making. 37 However,
the shareholder primacy model is not unassailable. Sharehold-
ers' ownership of stock may not be the equivalent of ownership
of private property: unlike typical private property, 38 the cor-
poration is a central productive element of our economy upon
which our nation depends for its vitality. 39 Further, share-
holder stock ownership frequently appears to be merely a
residual financial investment--quite unlike the "use and enjoy-
ment" interest of the owner of personal property. 40
2. Legislation Limiting Director Accountability
In direct response to Smith v. Van Gorkom,141 the Dela-
ware Legislature enacted Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
Corporate Code which allows firms to opt out of Van Gorkom's
strengthened duty of care standard.142 It permits companies to
amend their articles of incorporation to eliminate monetary lia-
bility of directors to the corporation and its shareholders, 143 es-
sentially allowing each firm to adopt its own business judgment
rule.144
All jurisdictions recognize the power of a corporation,
within specified limits, to indemnify its directors and officers
against expenses and liabilities incurred while carrying out
their duties. 145 These expenses include litigation costs directly
137. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1482-91 (noting that considera-
tion of nonshareholder interests aggravates conflicts of interest which inhere
in control change contexts).
138. Lipton and Rosenblum have explained: "To the extent there is an in-
trinsic nature to the corporation, it is more akin to that of a citizen, with re-
sponsibilities as well as rights, than to that of a piece of private property."
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 193.
139. Id. at 192.
140. See id. at 193-94 ("Stockholder's intrinsic ownership interest is a finan-
cial interest....").
141. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the business judgment rule did not protect the directors of a
company who breached their duty of care in approving a proposed cash
merger. Id. at 893.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991); see Note, Limiting Directors'
Duty of Care Liability: An Analysis of Delaware's Charter Amendment Ap-
proach, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543, 548 (1987).
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (1991).
144. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 14, at 7.
145. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, at part VII, § 7.20 cmt. a, at
905.
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resulting from service to the corporation.'4 Most of these stat-
utes provide for mandatory and permissive indemnification.
Most jurisdictions follow either the Delaware pattern or the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act (RMBCA)
pattern.147
Delaware law mandates corporate indemnification for ex-
penses incurred in any proceeding to the extent the director
has been successful.148 If the director loses, Delaware law per-
mits indemnification. 149 Corporations may provide for broader
indemnification in their bylaws or articles. 50 Section 8.50 of
the RMBCA limits indemnity to expenses incurred.' 5 ' The
statutes in twenty-eight states, following both the Delaware
and RMBCA patterns, expressly limit indemnification in deriv-
ative actions to expenses incurred, and preclude indemnifica-
tion of judgments paid in settlement.152
The statutes in every state except Vermont expressly per-
mit corporations to purchase insurance protecting officers and
directors against liability.153 For example, the Delaware statute
grants corporations the right to purchase insurance on behalf of
any director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation for
liability arising out of such capacity.3' 4 Thus, the insurance
coverage may be broader than indemnity coverage.'
5 5
3. Judicial Decisions Insulating Management
a. Employment of Defensive Measures
Since Moran v. Household International, Inc.,15 6 corporate
146. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
147. See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT § 8.50 (1984).
148. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991); see Merrett-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
149. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (a) (1991).
150. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 14, at 32.
151. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.50 (1984).
152. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 7.20 reporter's note 2.
153. See id § 7.20 reporter's note 4.
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1991).
155. See id § 145(b) (insurance could encompass liability associated with
shareholder derivative action even though otherwise limited under Delaware
law).
156. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). In Moran the Delaware Supreme Court up-
held a board's adoption of a shareholder rights plan. The court stated: "[P]re-
planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that,
under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reason-
able judgment. Therefore, in reviewing pre-planned defense mechanisms, it
seems even more appropriate to apply the business judgment rule." Id. at
1350. The Moran Chancery Court allowed directors to justify their actions
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adoption of shareholder rights plans, or poison pills, have be-
come routine matters which easily survive judicial scrutiny. 5 7
Moran opened the door for corporate boards to inject them-
selves unilaterally into the tender offer or control transaction
process, thereby presumptively requiring director approval as a
necessary step in the change of corporate control.
Shielded by the business judgment rule, either in its pure
or Delaware-modified form, directors have implemented nu-
merous defensive measures to resist hostile takeover bids,158 in-
cluding poison pills,159 stock repurchases, golden parachutes, 160
lock-up agreements, 161 and no-shop provisions.162
based on the interests of one or more corporate constituencies. Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch. 1985). The Chancery Court
stated that poison pills, if implemented "to protect all corporate constituencies
and not simply to retain control, have been consistently approved under the
business judgment rule." Id.
157. One Pennsylvania trial court held that "adoption of a rights plan per
se, passed at a time when the company is not a target of a hostile takeover,
clearly is valid and no cause of action [by a shareholder] exists." Steiner v.
Milton Roy Co., No. 6832, 1989 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 58 (Phil. Ct. Comm. P1.
Nov. 9, 1989). For a more detailed survey of relevant case law, see Victor I.
Lewkow & William A. Groll, Selected Issues in Acquisition Defense (Apr. 11,
1988) in KENNETH J. BIALKN & ARTHUR FLEiSCHER, JR., TENTH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON AcQuisrrIONS AND TAKEOVERS (1988).
158. Consistent with the wide latitude the business judgment rule grants
directors, courts have upheld a variety of defensive measures. See, e.g., Gear-
hart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 724 (5th Cir. 1984) (deploying
"springing warrants"); Enterra Corp v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 688 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (entering into "standstill agreements" whereupon potential offerors
agree not to proceed with offer).
159. See Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, An Examination of a Board of Direc-
tors' Duty to Redeem the Rights Issued Pursuant to a Stockholder Rights Plan,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537 (1989); Patrick J. Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights
Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1989).
160. These executive termination agreements are "contracts between cor-
porations and their executive personnel guaranteeing generous severance ben-
efits in the event of a corporate takeover." Drew H. Campbell, Note, Golden
Parachutes: Common Sense from the Common Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 280
(1990).
161. Lock-up options and bust-up fees involve the right to purchase target
stock or assets on favorable terms. Without these favorable terms, white
knights would not likely assist a target. A target corporation board may grant
a white knight the option to purchase key corporate assets, a strategy known
as the "crown jewel" defense. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1457-58
n.221.
162. White knights often require no-shop covenants by the target prevent-
ing the target from soliciting or encouraging anyone to make a competing bid
or otherwise assist would-be acquirors. In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a no-
shop provision, asserting that "[a]bsent a material advantage to the stockhold-
ers from the terms or structure of a bid that is contingent on a no-shop clause,
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The "just say no" defense decrees that a board need not
abandon its antitakeover weaponry when surrender defeats the
corporation's longterm interests.163 In Paramount Communi-
cations v. Time, Inc.,'6 the Delaware Supreme Court held that
a board is not under any duty to maximize shareholder value in
the short term.'65 Although Paramount's fact-specific holding
arguably reaches only those unusual takeover contexts where
the target corporation has reached a definitive restructuring
plan and has taken all steps necessary to consummate its plan,
the court's expansive approach has added much weight to the
"just say no" position. 66
Paramount also illustrates that business planning not pri-
marily designed as an antitakeover scheme167 may serve as a
preplanning defensive strategy.L8s Beyond the use of the "just
a successful bidder imposing such a condition must be prepared to survive the
scrutiny which that concession demands." Id at 1286; see also Barkan v. Arm-
stad Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) ("Where a board has no reasonable
basis upon which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-
shop restriction gives rise to the inference the board seeks to forestall compet-
ing bids.").
163. For one analysis of the "just say no" defense, see Robert A. Prentice
& John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense"
May Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377 (1990). Prentice and Langmore define the just say no defense in
terms of the nagging question: "Is it ever permissible for target management
to refuse to provide an alternative, yet still oppose the hostile tender offer?"
Id. at 382.
164. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
165. I& at 1150.
166. See Kozyris, supra note 100, at 263 n.3. (stating that Paramount dealt
"the ultimate blow against any serious judicial control over management
oppositionism").
167. Chancellor Allen held that Time's legitimate "interest" in combining
with Warner Communications may be protected by defensive action.
In my opinion, where the board has not elected explicitly or implicitly
to assume the special burdens recognized by Revlon, but continues to
manage the corporation for longterm profit pursuant to a preexisting
business plan that is not primarily a control device or scheme, the cor-
poration has a legally cognizable interest in achieving that plan.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989).
168. The Delaware court in TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,334, at 92,147 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2,
1989), stated that it is "non-controversial" that
directors, in managing the business and affairs of the corporation may
find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are ex-
pected to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests,
even if short run share value can be expected to be negatively af-
fected, and thus directors in pursuit of long run corporate (and share-
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say no" defense to consummate carefully negotiated plans like
that found in Paramount, the defense may apply if the offer 69
is coercive, 7 0 or inadequate,' 7 ' and if resisting the offer contin-
ues to serve a valid purpose, such as promoting shareholder
value.' 72
holder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other "corporate
constituencies."
Id. The recent decision in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d
278 (Del. Ch. 1989), buttresses the use of longterm planning as a defensive
preplanning strategy. Focussing on longterm corporate goals, the court found
Polaroid's pre-planned employee stock option plan "fundamentally fair" de-
spite its highly antitakeover timing and effect. Id. at 291.
169. If a suitor insists the target take decisive action (e.g., auction the com-
pany) upon the target receiving a bare offer, courts will not force redemption
of the company's poison pill. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). Applying Delaware law, the
Amanda court stated that Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985), and its progeny do not require a target to place itself on the auc-
tion block. Id. at 1013. In distinguishing Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury
Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), the Amanda court stressed that only 27% of
Universal's shareholders had tendered as against Pillsbury's 87% tender; Uni-
versal was on an upswing, but Pillsbury was on a downswing;, and Universal's
board had made an informed decision about the adequacy of Amanda's offer,
considering 12 alternative responses to the offers. Id. at 1013-14. The court
also considered that the bid posed a threat to the shareholders who did not
tender if Amanda failed to obtain financing;, in addition, there was a threat
that the offer contained false or misleading information given Amanda's com-
plex financing. Id, Apparently, Amanda requires that the offer pose a real
threat to shareholders. See Buckhorn, Inc., v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209,
228 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987). Applying Delaware law, the
Buckhorn court held that Buckhorn's board had no duty to sell merely be-
cause of preliminary negotiations with one potential bidder. Id.; see also Ivan-
hoe Partners, Ltd. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)
(shareholder's entering into a 10-year standstill agreement after raising its
stake in Newmont to 49.7% from 26% did not amount to a sale of the company
requiring Newmont to negotiate with a possible bidder when a bidding contest
was not yet underway).
170. Whenever a suitor's coercive or inadequate offer poses a threat to a
corporation, courts uphold the defensive measures as "reasonable in relation
to the threat posed." Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 286-87 (finding an all-
cash, all-shares offer coercive). Other cases have upheld directors' decisions
not to sell a corporation because of the coerciveness of an offer. See Desert
Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Applying Dela-
ware law, the Desert Partners court approved USG's decision neither to negoti-
ate nor to redeem its rights plan amid a hostile, two-tiered offer by Desert
Partners. Id. at 1300; see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950 (partial tender offer);
Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345 (two-tiered offer).
171. If a board in good faith determines that a bid is inadequate, that alone
justifies leaving a pill in place. See City Capital Assocs., Ltd. v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch. 1988). But see Amanda, 708 F. Supp. at 1014-15.
172. See, e.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342
(Del. Ch. 1989). In Holly Farms, plaintiff Tyson and its competitor, ConAgra,
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b. Consideration of "Corporate Welfare"
Although the drive toward the "longterm corporate wel-
fare" norm derives from many sources, the seeds of this propo-
sition originate from judicial enhancement of the concept of
"the best interests of the corporation,1' 73 a phrase common to
corporate statutes and decisions defining a director's duty of
care. Some commentators also argue that a corporation has an
"independent interest in its own longterm business success."1 74
Not until Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,'75 however, had
the Delaware judiciary directly endorsed directors' considera-
tion of nonshareholder constituencies. 176 Since the 1985 deci-
sion, twenty-nine states have enacted legislation allowing
bid for Holly Farms. The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction re-
quiring Holly Farms to redeem its rights plan since the pill served the valid
purpose of preventing Tyson from blocking ConAgra's economically superior
offer. Since there were no other bidders, the shareholders would be harmed if
ConAgra withdrew its offer, rendering legitimate the unredeemed pill. Id.
Shareholder interests may also be advanced when the board is granted
sufficient time to consider other alternatives. See Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d
at 285-86.
173. For example, the Delaware Chancery court in TW Services, Inc. v.
SWT Acquisition, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at
92,147 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), equated "shareholder longterm interests" with
"multi-constituency interests":
The knowledgeable reader will recognize that this particular phrase
masks the most fundamental issue: to what interest does the board
look in resolving conflicts between interests in the corporation that
may be characterized as "shareholder longterm interests" or "corpo-
rate entity interests" or "multi-constituency interests" on the one
hand, and interests that may be characterized as "shareholder short
term interests" or "current share value interests" on the other?
Id.
174. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 202. Lipton and Rosen-
blum explain:
The greater the amount of goods or services the enterprise can sell,
and the greater the difference between what the consumer is willing
to pay and what the goods or services cost to produce, the greater the
profit that inures to the enterprise. Viewed in this light, the corpo-
rate enterprise has an independent interest of its own in the success-
ful operation of its business, with success measured in terms of
present and expected profit.
Id. at 203.
175. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
176. Id at 955 (stating that a director may consider "the impact [of a take-
over] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders"). Unocal illustrates the de-
gree to which the business judgment rule may be wielded to expand the
already broad scope of a director's discretion to bypass shareholder input.
Thus, the business judgment rule in the takeover context may allow stake-
holder interests to be furthered at the expense of shareholders. See Matheson
& Olson, supra note 6, at 1455-66 (analyzing protectionist case law).
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directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies. 177
How are directors to consider these constituencies in con-
junction with the fiduciary duty they owe shareholders?178
Even during a takeover, if directors focus primarily on share-
holders' best interests, both shareholders and stakeholders si-
multaneously benefit,179 but numerous problems emerge from a
stakeholder model in which directors are allowed to consider
stakeholder interests. 8
0
First, since a corporation would harm itself by discarding
valuable employees or suppliers,' 8 ' the extra protection assists
primarily suboptimal employees, suppliers, or creditors who
would be affected by a "shareholder primacy" approach. 8 2
Since most nonshareholders are already protected by other
laws, 83 stakeholder problems resulting from board action
177. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1540-45.
178. Until a takeover becomes imminent, directors may consider non-
shareholder constituencies in deploying takeover defenses as long as they also
benefit the shareholders. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating that a board may consider non-
shareholder constituencies "provided there are rationally related benefits ac-
cruing to stockholders. . . . However, such concern for non-stockholder
interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress
[such that the sole duty is] to sell it to the highest bidder."); see also TW
Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at 92,147 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (noting that "[w]hen a corporation is
in a 'Revlon mode,' legitimate concerns relating to the claims of other constitu-
encies are absent and, indeed, concerns about the corporation as a distinct en-
tity become attenuated."); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d
1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989) (holding that a board may consider "the impact of
both the bid and the potential acquisition on other constituencies, provided
that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests");
ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential For
Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990) [hereinafter Other Constituencies].
179. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1190-92;
cf Other Constituencies, supra note 178, at 2269 (suggesting that a better inter-
pretation of directors' duties statutes and related case law allows directors to
take into account nonshareholder constituencies, but only "to the extent that
the directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as short term, of the
shareholders and the corporation").
180. For a recent analysis of directors' duty legislation, see Other Constitu-
encies, supra note 178, at 2263-70.
181. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1170-71.
182. See id.
183. See Other Constituencies, supra note 178, at 2268 (discussing how cred-
itors, management, employees, and unions have other means of protection); see
also Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Contro" A Critical Analy-
sis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 884 (1987) (noting that
employees are protected by labor laws and stating that legislation "governing
hostile takeovers should not attempt to minimize noninvestors' risks at the ex-
pense of our free market system").
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under a shareholder primacy perspective would be short
term.'84
Second, requiring accountability to holders of conflicting
interests may ultimately harm both groups.'8 5 Directors who
are free to consider nonshareholder interests would be less ac-
countable to shareholders.1 86 In addition, the "standard" by
which courts articulate a director's duty to stakeholders defies
precise definition. 8 7 The undefined parameters of this "stan-
dard" fuels directors' uncertainty regarding their allegiance to
shareholders. 88
184. In addition, employees or suppliers are usually only temporarily dis-
placed-that is, many constituencies have the capacity to find a replacement
for their reliance on the target.
185. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1192; see
also Andre, supra note 183, at 884-85 ("[Mlanagement should not be asked or
allowed to attempt to carry out the impossible task of acting as fiduciaries for
groups with competing interests."); Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 121,126 (1990).
186. In the narrowest sense, when directors are free to consider non-
shareholder interests in takeover scenarios rather than focus on the sole objec-
tive of maximizing shareholder wealth, their "accountability" is diminished
inasmuch as shareholders can less easily monitor a manager's performance.
See Johnson, supra note 14, at 881-84.
Former SEC chairman Davis S. Ruder has explained that director ac-
countability to a clearly defined group (i.e., shareholders) is a cornerstone of
the corporate system: "If management duties to others are declared, the pro-
cess of corporate accountability will be thrown into disarray." David S. Ruder,
Speech to the American Bar Association committee responsible for the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act (Aug. 6, 1990), in ABA Model Act Panel
Rejects Other-Constituencies Measures, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33,
1217 (Aug. 17, 1990).
187. Directors' duty legislation affords no guidance on how directors should
consider nonshareholder constituencies. See Dennis J. Block & Yvette Miller,
The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Con-
tests, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 44, 69 (1983); Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1538-
45.
188. The issue thus becomes whether director duties statutes consti-
tute an efficient and desirable way to provide protections for non-
shareholder groups. The Committee has concluded that permitting-
much less requiring-directors to consider these interests without re-
lating such consideration in an appropriate fashion to shareholder
welfare (as the Delaware courts have done) would conflict with direc-
tors' responsibility to shareholders and could undermine the effective-
ness of the system that has made the corporation an efficient device
for the creation of jobs and wealth.
The Committee believes that the better interpretation of these
statutes, and one that avoids such consequences, is that they confirm
what the common law has been: directors may take into account the
interests of other constituencies but only as and to the extent that the
directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as short term, of
the shareholders and the corporation. ...
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes,
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II. ESCALATING TENSIONS AND THE PATHWAY TO
REFORM
Proxy contests, shareholder proposals, derivative suits, in-
dependent directors and a panoply of other remedial efforts
have failed to assuage aggressive and increasingly expert insti-
tutional investors seeking to increase their voice in corporate
governance. Why are institutional investors declaring war
against the current governance regime? This movement has
many facets and components. First, as noted above, the current
anti-shareholder landscape embraced by management and legis-
lators eager to maintain the corporate status quo has inhibited
shareholder involvement. Second, institutional shareholders
quite sincerely seek to maximize the value of their shares but
find the current regime less than sympathetic to this goal.
The current anti-shareholder terrain inhibits shareholders
from flexing their ownership muscle and reduces their incen-
tives to invest the time and effort needed to contribute mean-
ingfully to the longterm health of the corporation. This is an
exceptionally costly development. A sine qua non for resolving
the shareholder/nonshareholder tension, therefore, is a mecha-
nism for harnessing valuable shareholder input on longterm
corporate profitability.
A. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
1. The Phenomenal Rise of the Institutional Shareholder
The past decade witnessed a staggering rise of institutional
share ownership with an equally dramatic increase in the con-
centration of shareholdings. Numerous factors have interacted
and coalesced to compel institutional shareholders to expand
their active involvement in corporate governance issues.
Among these are the increased size and concentration of invest-
ments by institutional shareholders, their enhanced sophistica-
tion, and the marked down-turn in takeovers as a means of
monitoring and disciplining management.
By 1988, institutional assets had exploded to five trillion
if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of various
constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests,
would be profoundly troubling... When directors must not only de-
cide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their duty
of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can be
expected.
Other Constituencies, supra note 178, at 2268-69 (emphasis added).
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dollars, or 18.7% of total financial assets in the United States.189
In 1989, institutions held forty-three percent of all equities and
fifty percent of the fifty largest companies' equity.190 The fifty
largest institutions owned $925 billion in stocks, or twenty-
seven percent of the stock market.191 By 1990, institutional in-
vestors owned forty-five percent of outstanding corporate eq-
uity.192 By the end of 1990, institutional share ownership
swelled to fifty-three percent. 93
Pension funds, the largest class of institutional investors,
owned roughly forty-four percent of all institutional holdings in
1987.194 Controlling more than $2.5 trillion in assets, pension
funds alone currently own more than twenty-five percent of all
publicly traded equity in U.S. companies.195 This percentage is
very significant inasmuch as a recent study notes that stocks
held in pension fund portfolios are held on average for two and
one-half years.196
Investments in common stock by state and local pension
systems ballooned from $10.1 billion in 1970 to $150.2 billion in
1986 and to an estimated $240 billion in institutional holdings in
1990.197 Although the equity holdings of private pension funds
have been relatively stable since 1982,198 state and local govern-
ment pension holdings have increased markedly, to a total of
$223.7 billion in stocks in 1988, equivalent to 9.1% of the New
York Stock Exchange's (NYSE's) total market value.199
The primary impetus for increased shareholder activism
likely stems from increased ownership concentration. 200 Voting
power is increasingly concentrated among a small number of
major institutions. Increasingly concentrated share ownership
drives institutional activism in two ways. First, institutions
189. Clifford L. Whitewall, Institutional Ownership, in INSTrrUTONAL IN-
vESTORS, supra note 3, at 75, 79. In contrast, institutional assets amounted to
$107 billion or 8.4% of the total United States financial assets.
190. Brancato, supra note 3, at 406-07.
191. See The Institutional Investor 300: Ranking America's Top Money
Managers, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 3, at 137, 173. Percentages
are based on the Wilshire 5000 Index.
192. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 29.
193. Black, supra note 8, at 827.
194. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 29.
195. I&
196. See James A. Waite, Pension Funds Try to Retire the Idea that They
Are Villains, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1990, at Cl.
197. Whitewall, supra note 189, at 79.
198. Id at 80.
199. I&
200. July 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 9, at 34.
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which own a large stake in a corporation are less able to sell
their shares and take the "Wall Street walk."20 1 As James
Martin of one institutional fund, the College Requirement and
Equities Fund, attests, "we're the quintessential long-term in-
vestors.' '20 2 Second, a greater stake means a greater incentive
to invest time and resources toward improving corporate moni-
toring and performance.
Major shareholders thus have begun to unite toward more
effectively wielding their immense power. The Council of In-
stitutional Investors serves as a nucleus for institutional activ-
ism. 203  Institutional Shareholder Services advises large
institutional investors on corporate governance issues.204 Anal-
ysis Group provides economic and financial consulting services
to institutional investors.20 5 Analysis Group has created the In-
stitutional Voting Research Service to evaluate the governance
and economic performance of large corporations.
Institutional shareholders may become a powerful lobbying
force. Although institutions failed to defeat antitakeover legis-
lation recently enacted in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts,
they succeeded in modifying the laws to allow for opt out
clauses.206
2. Current Governance Initiatives by Major Shareholders
As noted above,20 7 institutions with a large proportion of
shares and a relatively high concentration of a small number of
players have become increasingly active.208 One important de-
velopment in this shareholder activism is the institutions' in-
volvement in proxy contests. Proxy solicitors, dissidents, and
201. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1477-79.
202. David Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemen, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1989,
at 46, 46.
203. Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Trends in Institutional
Shareholder Activism: What the Institutions are Doing Today, in INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 3, at 45, 48. The Council of Institutional Inves-
tors has adopted a shareholder '%ill of rights" to enhance the shareholders'
role in making corporate management more accountable. See David A. Vise,
"Bill of Rights" Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
1986, at Fl.
204. Rosenblum & Korens, supra note 203, at 48.
205. Id.
206. For Pennsylvania, see Controversial Pa. Bill Would Make Takeovers
More Difficult, 22 Sec. & Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 474 (1990). For Massa-
chusetts, see Hillary Durgin, Massachusetts Enters Takeover Fray: Bill Would
Mandate Classified Boards, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Apr. 16, 1990, at 1.
207. See supra part II.A.1.
208. See Conard, supra note 13, at 132-33.
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corporations understand that institutional investors "now hold
the key to most important proxy initiatives," and have thereby
placed increased emphasis on influencing institutions.20 9 Over
the long term, such proxy challenges may result in negotiated
settlements, thus moving toward a longterm working
partnership. 210
An increasing number of shareholder proposals also have
received substantial and sometimes majority support. For ex-
ample, six major companies, Armco, Avon, Champion Interna-
tional, K-Mart, Lockheed, and Ryder System, adopted
proposals to redeem or require shareholder approval of poison
pills. 211
In 1989, institutional muscle expressed itself through 215
governance proposals. As of August, 285 governance proposals
had surfaced in 1990.212 Votes in favor of these proposals
reached new highs: support for poison pills averaged twenty-
nine percent of outstanding shares (36.7% of votes cast); votes
for confidential voting averaged 23.6% of outstanding shares
(30.3% of votes cast); votes for opting out of the Delaware take-
over statute averaged 31.9% of outstanding shares (38.9% of
votes cast); and votes in favor of eliminating "golden
parachutes" averaged eighteen percent of outstanding shares
(24.3% of votes cast).213
One new type of initiative, sponsored by the College Re-
tirement Equities Fund, proposed limiting the ability of direc-
tors to place "significant" new blocks of voting stock absent
prior shareholder approval. Placing such blocks of voting stock
in friendly hands effectively grants boards veto power over un-
wanted takeover activity.2 14 The most pervasive examples of
these include Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and
209. May 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 21, at 20.
210. Id at 20.
211. Id. at 24.
212. See John J. Gavin, Changes in Corporate Control and Governance
Communicated Through Proxy Power, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra
note 3, at 91, 96.
213. See American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Letter to Ms.
Linda C. Quinn, in INSTmrUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 3, at 193, 200. Re-
sponding to this expanding institutional might, corporations began either
adopting these governance proposals "voluntarily" or negotiating with the in-
stigating institutions. Analysis Group concluded that opposition groups
achieved partial or complete victories in 78% of their attempts between Sep-
tember 1989 and May 1990. See Gavin, supra note 212, at 97.
214. See May 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 21, at 23-24.
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strategic block placements.2 15
These shareholder initiatives are evidence of two important
facts. First, they reflect the desire of institutional investors to
voice their say on significant corporate policy matters. The
breadth of the proposals and the increasing significance of the
vote in favor of such proposals show that the strength of this
desire is a continuing phenomenon. Today's institutional share-
holders, taking the lead for shareholders as a group, appear to
desire to be involved in and consulted on a broader variety of
corporate issues.
Second, the shareholder proposal process is an imperfect
mechanism for making shareholder feelings known. The prob-
lem is the lack of an effective process in which these sharehold-
ers can be more actively involved. Similarly, corporate
directors have no incentive to seek such input. Consequently,
shareholders are locked out of the decision-making process on
many issues that affect the value of their shares, the future
course of the corporation, or both.
B. REFORMING GOVERNANCE BY IMPROVING THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
In the past several decades, much reform has sought to al-
ter board composition. Chief among these proposals have been
reforms aimed at installing independent directors who, in the-
ory, would be free of the conflicts of interest that affect man-
agement executives.
Courts have stressed the importance of outside directors
providing objective oversight and reasoned business judg-
ment.216 One group of corporate executives would recommend
an "overwhelmingly outside board. '21 7 The Council of Corpo-
rate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association also stresses
the central role of outside directors.2 18 The Business Round-
table advises that outside directors should constitute no less
215. Id at 24.
216. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985); cf. Rev-
lon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d. 173, 177 n.3 (Del. 1986).
217. JEREMY BACON & JAES K. BROWN, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CoRPo-
RATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE
BOARD 62-63 (1973). The Conference Board is an association of executives of
large corporations. See Conard, supra note 13, at 129 n.40.
218. See E. Norman Veasey & Jesse A. Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute
Allows Limits on Director Liability and Modernizes Indemnification Protec-
tion, Bus. LAw. UPDATE, July-Aug. 1986, at 1-2.
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than a "critical mass."21.9 The Corporate Director's Guidebook
of the American Bar Association recommends that certain com-
mittees of the board be composed exclusively of "nonmanage-
ment" directors.220 Since its inception, the American Law
Institute's Corporate Governance Project (ALI Project) has rec-
ommended that large public corporations have specified propor-
tions of independent directors who are "free of any significant
relationships with the corporation's senior executives."22'
The proposals for reforming the nature and composition of
the board vary significantly with the proponent. For example,
institutional investors recently filed proxy resolutions with nu-
merous firms demanding that a majority of directors be in-
dependent of management.222 Louis Lowenstein would allow
shareholders to control a few directorships.22 Two interesting
reform proposals advanced this decade seek to elevate the
board to a position non plus ultra. Lipton and Rosenblum's
proposal would grant boards a five-year life span that could be
cut short only by board conduct of the most egregious ilk.22
Gilson and Kraakman's proposal would reinvent the outside di-
rector by proposing that corporations adopt an institutional in-
vestor-sponsored "core" of "professional" directors whose
219. Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Di-
rectors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAw.
2083, 2108 (1978) [hereinafter Business Roundtable 1978].
220. COMmITTEE ON CORPORATE LAws, ABA, CORPORATE DHIECrOR's
GUiDEBOOK, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1625-27 (1978) (discussing the
composition of the nominating, compensation, and audit committees).
221. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 3A.01 (cross-references omit-
ted). The first draft required that large, publicly held corporations have
boards with a majority of such directors. AMEMCAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 1) (1982). In 1984, this requirement
was changed to a "recommendation of [good] corporate practice." AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 3.04 (Tentative Draft No. 2) (1984).
222. Hillary Durgin, Fighting For Independence, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 1, 1 (noting that the issue of insider boards is at the top of the
corporate governance agenda). Similarly, in an effort to garner support in its
proxy fight with Carl Icahn, Texaco's management agreed to select one board
member from a slate of directors provided by CalPERS. James Flanigan, Tex-
aco Stresses the "Share" in "Shareholders," L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1989, pt. IV, at
1.
223. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 77, at 205-18.
224. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 225-28. Scholars appear to
have widely varied views about how effective the Lipton/Rosenblum proposal
is likely to be. See, e.g., 'Intriguing, But...,' Observers Say in Response to
Plan for Five-Year Terms, No-Holds-Barred Elections, 6 Corp. Couns. Wkly.
(BNA) No. 19, at 8 (May 8, 1991).
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livelihood would depend primarily upon shareholder
approbation.225
Although installing independent directors is an essential
component of an optimal governance structure, improving the
nature, character, and function of the board is but a first step in
governance reform. Indeed, the facial "independence" of direc-
tors resolves only part of the conflict of interest between man-
agement and shareholders. Managers "can easily find directors
who are neither subordinates, relatives, nor suppliers, who will
support almost anything that the executives propose, and who
will resign in extreme cases rather than oppose the executives
who have invited them to the board."226 One commentator sug-
gests that rather than manage, boards react; they render advice
when solicited and replace the chief executive officer only in
dire emergencies.22 7
Even with nominating committees composed of independ-
ent directors, management continues to influence the selection
of directors. Management typically can veto candidates. In ad-
dition, outside directors, aware of the ability of management to
influence the composition of the board, naturally tend to mesh
their decision making with that of management. 228 One oft-
cited example of independent outside directors' inability to con-
strain self-interested behavior is the use of "Special Litigation
Committees," consisting of independent directors, to determine
whether corporations should consummate a shareholder deriva-
tive suit against their officers or directors. One study noted
that "although there have been more than a score of special lit-
igation committee cases ... in all but one the committee con-
cluded that the suit in question was not in the corporation's
best interest. '2 29
Moreover, even totally independent directors are faced to-
day with two significant problems that cloud their judgment.
First, the recent development of the multi-constituency concept
225. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 883-92.
226. Conard, supra note 13, at 129 (citing James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Im-
plications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at
83); see M. SOSNOFF, SILENT INvESTOR, SILENT LOSER 170-74, 182-83 (1986).
227. MYLES L. MACE, DiREcTORs, MYTH AND REALrrY 178-90 (1971).
228. "All too often . . . [independent directors] turn out to be more in-
dependent of shareholders than they are of management." Gilson & Kraak-
man, supra note 12, at 873.
229. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative
Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the AL Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959,
963.
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leaves directors flailing when faced with an issue that poten-
tially has a different impact on different constituencies. How
do they balance these tradeoffs? It is unclear to whom, if any-
one, these directors owe their primary allegiance.
Second, under current statutes and case law, the directors
rarely have the opportunity or the incentive to obtain the input
of the shareholders on even the most fundamental governance
issues. The modern corporate framework envisions that direc-
tors, not shareholders, typically make policy decisions. Given
this current setup, directors can hardly suggest calling a share-
holder meeting. Shareholder input is not required and there-
fore does not factor significantly into the decision-making
process.
C. REFORMING GOVERNANCE BY IMPROVING THE PROXY
SYSTEM
Many commentators acknowledge that proxy voting as cur-
rently constituted is not an ideal system for expressing share-
holder sentiment. Koppes and Gillan liken proxy contests to
"beauty contests," stressing that, while resort to a challenge
through a proxy contest may be appropriate in certain limited
circumstances, the exorbitant costs and adversarial nature of
proxy contests "often threaten to destroy a company rather
than benefit it." 0
Shortcomings in the current proxy system abound. Large
shareholders typically avoid openly opposing management.
231
In addition, the formidable advantages that incumbents enjoy
permit boards sympathetic to current management to retain
control almost without limit.22 Moreover, a corporation's cost
of subsidizing numerous proxy fights could be substantial.
233
Finally, from a regulatory standpoint, the SEC has a surpris-
ingly limited ability to intrude into state jurisdiction over cor-
porate governance and shareholder voting rights.2
230. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30 ("[R]ecent proxy challenges have
appeared to disintegrate into 'beauty contests'-mere competition between
clever 'sound bites.' ").
231. See Dent, supra note 14, at 903-05. Shareholders "tend to vote for
management because assertive shareholders encounter management hostility.
Managers can deny rebellious shareholders valuable information." I& at 904
(footnote omitted).
232. See i&i at 903.
233. Id- at 908.
234. James Lyons, States' Rights vs. Shareholders' Rights, FORBES, Sept. 17,
1990, at 56, 56.
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Proposals for modifying the system vary greatly. People
with viewpoints as diverse as Victor Brudney and Martin Lip-
ton would grant shareholders with large holdings access to cor-
porate funds for proxy solicitations.2 35  Professor Dent
"proposes to unite ownership and control by transferring con-
trol of proxy solicitations to a committee of a corporation's larg-
est shareholders. '2 36 Dent would grant exclusive access to the
corporate treasury for proxy solicitations to a committee of the
ten or twenty largest shareholders of the corporation.P 7 Pro-
fessor Eisenberg would grant shareholders collectively holding
more than five percent of a firm's stock the ability to nominate
directors in the firm's proxy statement.23s The authors of this
Article believe that these proposals have merit and deserve
study for implementation in connection with the proposals
made herein.239
As part of its review of federal proxy rules, in June, 1991,
the SEC proposed changes under the Securities Exchange
Act.240 These proposed changes would make it easier for large
shareholders to communicate among themselves by exempting
them, in some situations, from making proxy statement filings
235. Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corpo-
rate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 284-85 (1966); Lipton, Corporate Govern-
ance, supra note 6, at 67-69.
236. Dent, supra note 14, at 882.
237. Id. at 907.
238. EISENBERG, supra note 38, at 117.
239. Other forms of institutional-shareholder involvement include informal
agreements to communicate and the creation of "restructuring" funds which
combine the resources of several investors for the purpose of taking a large,
influential ownership interest in companies. See Koppes & Gillan, supra note
8, at 30. Koppes and Gillan stress that such informal, one-to-one channels of
communication are appropriate "[w]hen a shareholder has a specific concern
regarding a specific major investment.. . ." Id. They say "these efforts can be
successful only on an 'ad hoc' basis; no shareholder, not even one as large as
CalPERS ... has the resources necessary to seek and participate individually
in meetings with every company that may be performing below expectations."
1d.
"Restructuring" funds often retain business experts to assist the target
companies improve performance. Id. Koppes and Gillan suggest, however,
that these "restructuring" funds have limited use due to their potential for
abuse. "When used as an antitakeover device, this mechanism can thwart posi-
tive, constructive change in favor of maintenance of the status quo." Id. Their
costliness is also a factor. Id. ("[Tihe universe of American corporations is
simply too large to make this a viable model for shareholder/corporation com-
munications in any but the smallest, or poorest performing, or most vulnera-
ble, institutional holdings.").
240. See SEC Proposes Changes to Facilitate Communications Among
Shareholders, Including Eased Filing Requirements, 6 Corp. Couns. Wkly.
(BNA) No. 25, at 8 (June 19, 1991).
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even if they communicate with more than ten shareholders in
the company;241 eliminate the requirement that shareholders
contesting a proxy issue submit "preliminary" documents to the
SEC;2 and facilitate access to shareholder lists.243 Such pro-
posals, if adopted, would help shareholders communicate on
corporate matters.2 " Still, proxy rules are not an ideal solu-
tion. As one commentator stated:
[I]n many ways, the proxy rules discourage responsible, long-term in-
vestors from playing a meaningful role in the governance of public
corporations. The proxy rules in their present form have evolved in
and been shaped by an environment that reflects an underlying phi-
losophy of protecting registrants from shareholder involvement ....
The current rules... are an impediment to better corporate govern-
ance to the extent that they suffocate shareholder input or insulate
management.245
D. THE ALI PROJECT
The ALI Project, formally initiated in 1978, towers above
other proposals in its exhaustive treatment of governance re-
form. The ALI Project intends to cover only those parts of cor-
porate law relating to corporate governance and, indeed, "only
the most important aspects of corporate governance."'246 The
ALI Project's recommendations on corporate governance in-
clude not only issues governed by state legislation, but also is-
sues relating to the general practice of corporations and the
management of corporate affairs.2 7
A cornerstone of the ALI Project is the monitoring model
of corporate governance pioneered by Professor Melvin Eisen-
241. The proposed changes would exempt "disinterested" shareholders
from the proxy statement requirement. I& "Disinterested shareholders" are
persons who have no financial interest either in the company (aside from be-
ing a shareholder) or in the outcome of a proxy issue such as a proposed recap-
italization or merger. Id "The purpose of the proposed amendment would be
to allow shareholders to tell other shareholders they were dissatisfied or ob-
jected to management and other proposals without fearing they would become
subject to SEC proxy rules." Id
242. Under the proposal, only the "definitive" or final form of advertise-
ments, letters, and related documents need be filed with the SEC. Id.
243. I&
244. See Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy
Reform, 17 J. CoRp. L. (forthcoming 1992).
245. Robert A.G. Monks, The Current Legal Environment and Proposals
for Reform, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 3, at 155, 157 (reprinting
CalPERS' submission to the SEC, dated November 3, 1989, requesting that the
SEC undertake a review of the proxy system).
246. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 498.
247. Goldstein, supra note 80, at 507.
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berg, the Project's chief reporter,248 in which independent
outside directors' primary function is to oversee or monitor
management. 249 The ALI recommends that "[t]he board of
every large publicly held corporation... have a majority of di-
rectors who are free of any significant relationship with the
corporation's senior executives."250 The ALI also recommends
that corporations implement independent audit committees,251
independent nominating committees,2 2 and independent com-
pensation committees. 2ss
Complementing this monitoring model, the ALI Project
endorses a "command model" of corporate governance to stimu-
late directors by threat of sanction.2 Although fiduciary du-
ties function effectively in the context of well-defined activities,
they are less effective when discretion predominates. 255 How-
ever, the limited circumstances under which directors might be
personally liable makes this approach somewhat unrealistic.256
Recognizing that indemnification and insurance may serve
248. See Dent, supra note 14, at 896.
249. EISENBERG, supra note 38, at 162-68.
250. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 3A.01 (cross-references
omitted).
A 1991 study by Korn/Ferry reported that the boards of responding
corporations had an average number of three inside and nine outside
directors. In 1985, Korn/Ferry had found that the comparable aver-
age was ten outside directors and four inside directors; in 1975, the av-
erage had been eight outside directors and five inside directors. The
1990 Korn/Ferry study predicts that in the next decade, the number
of insiders on the board will drop even further, from three to two, and
that increasingly the only insiders on the board will be the chief exec-
utive officer and the chief operating officer.
Id. § 3A.01 reporter's note 3 (citations omitted).
251. Id. § 3A.02.
252. Id. § 3A.04.
253. Id. § 3A.05. Unfortunately, even the Project's defenders submit that
its proposals will have only slight impact on corporate governance. Indeed,
Professor Eisenberg concedes that the monitoring model will make an impor-
tant difference only "in the 100th or 200th or 300th case." Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, Conference Panel Discussion: Federalism Issues in Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 598 (1984).
254. Dent, supra note 14, at 901.
255. Id.
256. "The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable ... for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a
search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack." Joseph
W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnift-
cation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968); see
also Weiss, supra note 14, at 15 ("Only in instances where directors have come
close to abdicating totally will the ALI's proposals make imposition of liability
somewhat more likely." (footnote omitted)).
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to neutralize the benefits of imposing sanctions upon directors,
the ALI proposes to limit these protections.2 7 This approach
runs counter to the almost universal trend toward indemnifica-
tion, exculpation, and insurance.2 8 In any event, legislatures
are unlikely to reverse themselves on these issues.
E. SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY COMMVITTEES AND THE SEEDS OF
LONGTERM SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
Reformers have also sought to identify or create alterna-
tive channels of involvement in corporate governance. For in-
stitutional investors to comply with their own fiduciary duties
to invest prudently, they must have the information necessary
to evaluate the performance of the directors to whom they have
delegated managerial responsibility.259 A recently proposed
mechanism by which shareholders seek to discuss governance
issues with management and the board is the shareholder advi-
sory committee. 260
Shareholder advisory committees are not a new concept.261
The powerful CalPERS Fund proposed such committees for
Avon Products, Inc.; Texaco, Inc.; and Sears, Roebuck & Co., in
which the Fund had significant holdings.262 Howard Sherman
of Institutional Shareholder Services views CalPERS' current
257. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 7.20(b) & cmt. h (setting
forth limitations on indemnification).
258. See Conard, supra note 13, at 129-30 (discussing an extension of the
business judgment rule that presumes that conflict-of-interest transactions are
valid when independent directors approve them).
259. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30; see also David G. Ball, The Inevi-
tability of Cetting Involved, 15 DIRECToRs & BOARDs, Winter 1991, at 56, 56
(noting that ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to vote knowledgeably).
260. Shareholder advisory committees are proper subjects for shareholder
proposals under rulings. See Rock, supra note 13, at 491 n.178 (citing, for ex-
ample, TRW, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 12, 1990, available in Westlaw,
FSEC-NAL file, 1990 WL 286008).
261. The contemporary form of these committees, however, differs from
past versions:
The idea [behind shareholder advisory committees] has considerable
historical precedent. In earlier eras, free of regulations that deter the
formation of outside shareholder groups ... I shareholder committees
were a relatively widespread phenomenon at public corporations.
They were typically organized informally when corporate perform-
ance or board behavior was suspect, and convened to oversee and
question the board. The current crop of shareholder committees pro-
pose a modern-day equivalent that is formal and internal to the corpo-
ration due to the deterrents that the regulations place on outside
committees and groups.
May 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 21, at 24.
262. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30.
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proposals to establish shareholder advisory committees as "the
most important shareholder initiative attempting to influence
shareholder-board relations."263 During a proxy contest be-
tween Lockheed Corporation and one of its shareholders, the
shareholder promised to establish a shareholder advisory com-
mittee if his director nominees were elected.264 In 1989, a First
Executive Corporation shareholder proposed that the board es-
tablish a seven-member shareholder advisory committee.265
Shareholder bankruptcy committees permitted under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code266 serve as one possible
model for corporate shareholder advisory committees. 267 A di-
rector often bears a responsibility to multiple constituencies
creating a conflict of interest similar to that a corporation faces
when it enters bankruptcy.2 68 Such a conflict may prevent the
director from adequately recognizing and representing share-
holder interests in such situations as hostile takeover bids and
derivative suits filed against officers or directors.26 9
263. Sherman, supra note 22, at 306.
264. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30.
265. First Executive Proxy Statement, May 1, 1989, at 10-11 available in
Westlaw, SEC-Online file.
266. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
267. Rock, supra note 13, at 492-93 n.188. The Bankruptcy Code provides
that: "On request of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment
of additional committees... of equity security holders if necessary to assure
[their] adequate representation." 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988). Furthermore, a
"committee of equity security holders appointed under subsection (a)(2) of this
section shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the
seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor of the kinds repre-
sented on such committee." Id. § 1102(b)(2).
Shareholder bankruptcy committees thus set out one possible paradigm
for shareholder advisory committees. Rock, supra note 13, at 492-93. Under
Chapter 11, these committees are given the duty and power to represent the
equity security holders and may
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the ad-
ministration of the case; (2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabil-
ities, and financial condition of the debtor... ; (3) participate in the
formulation of [reorganization] plan[s] ... ; (4) request the appoint-
ment of a trustee or examiner... ; and (5) perform such other serv-
ices as are in the interest of the equity security holders.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988). The bankruptcy committee also has the power
"with the court's approval... [to] select and authorize the employment... [of]
attorneys, accountants, or other agents to represent or perform services for
such committee." Id § 1103(a).
268. Rock, supra note 13, at 493 ("When a corporation enters into a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization, the board of directors faces a conflict among its duties
and loyalties to its shareholders, officers, employees, creditors, and the
court.").
269. IH (In these circumstances, "directors may be ill-suited to represent
the interests of shareholders.").
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Since shareholder advisory committees are an untested,
evolving concept, they have no definitive composition.2 0 As
CalPERS proposed to Avon, for example, a shareholder advi-
sory committee would consist of at least nine members.271
Under the proposal, the board would retain authority over the
process of selecting committee members, provided that: each
member owned at least 1,000 shares of stock and was affiliated
with the corporation only as a shareholder and at least five
members were selected from the fifty largest beneficial owners
of the corporation's voting shares.272 CaIPERS further urged
that each membership term be limited to one year, and that no
member be eligible to serve more than three consecutive
terms.2 7 3 Finally, CalPERS proposed that Avon's shareholder
advisory committee provide advice to the board "regarding the
interests of shareholders on principal policy considerations rel-
evant to the company and its business, such as major restruc-
turing or acquisitions, mergers, compensation issues, and other
matters on which the board may choose to consult the
committee." 274
Shareholder advisory committees can both serve as a re-
source to the board and enhance relationships between a corpo-
ration and its largest providers of capital.275 These committees
are designed to overcome one of the classic problems in share-
holder governance participation: the free-rider problem. Gen-
erally, the free-rider problem focusses on incentives. Under
this theory, no individual shareholder has incentive to take ac-
tion that would benefit shareholders as a class since each share-
holder knows that its efforts would be enjoyed by all. Thus,
individual shareholders have an incentive to take no action
under the assumption that another will, and thus expect to en-
joy the benefits of the other's effortsY.6
The shareholder advisory committee may provide a more
efficient mechanism for investors with greater concentrations
of share ownership to be involved in the governance process.
With greater concentration, the potential benefits of providing
270. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30-31.
271. I at 31.
272. I-
273. Id- Such committees must be limited to providing non-binding, advi-
sory counsel to the corporation's board, because the shareholders have dele-
gated managerial responsibility to the elected directors. I&
274. I& at 31-32.
275. Id. at 32.
276. Sherman, supra note 22, at 306 n.8; Rock, supra note 13, at 456.
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discipline increase while the corresponding costs decrease.27
The magnitude of the enhanced benefits from this form of
monitoring, however, depends on the role and function of the
committee. For example, the benefits to a shareholder from a
purely advisory committee, although potentially substantial, are
expected to be less than those of a mandatory committee. 278 In
addition, the costs of organizing, monitoring, and influencing
management would correspondingly decrease since many costs
would be reimbursed and the costs of small, officially recog-
nized committees should be lower than the comparable costs
for large groups or committees formed for a particular issue.2 9
For all the potential that such advisory committees may
hold, their creation in all but the most extreme circumstances
currently is unlikely. As with the creation of creditor and
shareholder committees in the bankruptcy context, the corpo-
ration must experience significant problems before the inten-
sity of the focus by institutional shareholders will force
changes. Absent such extreme problems, it remains unlikely
that institutional shareholders will focus their energies on cre-
ating shareholder advisory committees at any particular
corporation.
III. TRANSCENDING THE DIALECTIC: THE
LONGTERM SHAREHOLDER MODEL OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The development of corporate governance regimes has fo-
cussed on extremes. Shareholder primacy, in its purest form,
cannot withstand scrutiny. The modern corporation is far more
than the sum of its shareholders.280 On the other hand, the
277. Rock, supra note 13, at 460.
278. If certain key decisions, such as whether the corporation should
be sold or whether or not to pursue a derivative suit, were delegated
to the committee, the committee would be likely to have a significant
impact. If the committee were purely advisory, the increase... could
still be substantial, because once the committee was in place, the man-
agers of a concentrated corporation could only ignore the institutional
shareholders' collective, organized advice at their peril.
Id. at 495.
279. Id To the extent major shareholders are repeat players, "the likeli-
hood is low that free riding will significantly undermine the shareholders'
committees." Id. at 496.
280. As Lipton and Rosenblum have noted:
The corporation affects the destinies of employees, communities, sup-
pliers, and customers. All these constituencies contribute to, and have
a stake in, the operation, success, and direction of the corporation.
Moreover, the nation and the economy as a whole have a direct inter-
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norm of longterm corporate welfare, in its modern form, elimi-
nates the meaningful shareholder input that institutional
shareholders have to offer.2s1
Institutional shareholders have been portrayed largely as
short-term, passive owners.28 2 Martin Lipton, one of the most
outspoken critics of institutional shareholders' motivations, in
an article with Steve Rosenblum, wrote:
The ascendancy of the institutional stockholder .... however, creates
an emphasis on short-term results that makes it increasingly difficult
for the corporation to maintain the long-term focus necessary to its
own and society's well-being... The short-term bias imposed by in-
stitutional stockholders and takeover activity is real, and this short-
term bias has substantial corporate and societal costs.2 83
Lipton and Rosenblum also note that the stock-
holder/managers of closely held, nonpublic corporations "have
an interest in developing the corporation, nurturing its busi-
ness, preserving its strength, and ensuring its future."2 4 In
contrast, "the stockholder/investors of the modern publicly
held corporation view the corporation more as the holder of a
betting slip views a racehorse."285
It is clear from the recent initiatives of major shareholders
that the Lipton/Rosenblum assertion that institutional inves-
tors are inherently short term is overstated. Moreover, to the
extent that the proposition is valid, the attitude of institutional
est in ensuring an environment that will allow the private corporation
to maintain its longterm health and stability. Rules of corporate own-
ership and governance must take account of many more interests
than do the rules governing less complex property.
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 192.
281. Even Lipton and Rosenblum concede that "stockholders deserve a
prominent voice in corporate governance." Id at 194.
282. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 863 ("An institution that
trades stock frequently is considered a short-term shareholder without a stake
in the future of the corporation."). Referring to a director's belief that the
benefit of stock appreciation should go to the longterm shareholders as op-
posed to short-term speculators, Jay W. Lorsch noted the purported distinction
between loyal shareholders and institutional investors:
By shareholders, this director means the loyal investor who holds the
company's shares for the longterm and, from the perspective of the
directors, institutions are the least loyal shareholders. In fact, they
have difficulty taking the institutional owner seriously, believing its
goals are at odds with the corporation's longer-term interests and are
too concerned with short-term gain.
JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CoRPo-
RATE BoARDs 46-47 (1989).
283. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 203.
284. I& at 194.
285. Id-
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shareholders is partially the result of being locked out of the
governance process. Contrary to the Lipton/Rosenblum claim,
institutional investors today, because of their large holdings, of-
fer the potential to resemble the nurturing owners of the
closely held business. The challenge is to develop a model of
corporate governance which provides major shareholders with
an incentive to invest in a corporation much as share-
holder/managers of a closely held corporation develop and nur-
ture their enterprise for the long term.
Indeed, given the current governance framework,
"[i]nstitutional stockholders have little incentive or inclination
to behave like traditional owners in the classical economic
model-that is, to work actively towards the long-term operat-
ing success of the corporation. '286 But straws are already in the
wind. Several major institutions have proven longterm track
records.287 Institutions, in addition, are no longer merely pur-
suing one-time takeover premiums.288 Institutions have, in
many circumstances, changed from "corporate gadfl[ies] to cor-
porate citizen[s]," whose substantial levels of ownership provide
legitimate reasons for them to invest time and money in im-
proving corporate monitoring and performance.289 Indeed,
Howard D. Sherman of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.,
notes that: "Most institutional shareholders, pension funds es-
pecially, have a de facto long-term planning horizon. Even if
they do not own stock in a given company indefinitely, the pen-
sion funds' sheer size means that they can expect to reassume
positions in the same company many times over, year after
year." 29
Similarly, Koppes and Gillan assert that "today's institu-
tional investor is a long-term holder of equity; since large insti-
tutions cannot easily buy and sell huge blocks of stock without
negatively affecting the value of their entire portfolios, institu-
286. Id. at 205-06.
287. Gilson and Kraakman note that "[s]ome of the largest institutional in-
vestors today are longterm investors. For example, the annual turnover rate
of [CalPERS] equity portfolio is approximately ten percent, and its average
holding period for particular stocks is between six and ten years." Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 12, at 863.
288. July 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 9, at 34.
289. I&
290. Sherman, supra note 22, at 300 n.1; see also Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 12, at 216-17 ("[Ihe large institutional stockholder is a long-term
investor in the market as a whole. Unless it divests itself of equities altogether
it will have an equity stake in a substantial portfolio of corporations regardless
of how long it maintains a stake in any one corporation.").
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tions have become almost a permanent shareholder. '29 '
A workable system of corporate governance for the mod-
em publicly held corporation cannot embrace the "shareholder
primacy" norm or the "longterm corporate welfare" norm to
the exclusion of the other. Such an approach ignores the un-
derlying currents now shaping the tensions among shareholders
and nonshareholders, namely, that shareholders are able to fo-
cus meaningfully and aggressively on the long term once
granted an incentive and legal basis to do so.
A mechanism is needed to transcend this dialectical frame-
work. Shareholders and management share the same funda-
mental interest.292 Over the long term, both demand sustained,
solid growth and profitability. Properly harnessed, institutional
capital will enable corporations to achieve exactly what they
most desire, namely, the longterm growth also sought by in-
vestment funds.293 A framework emphasizing the longterm
shareholder should encourage shareholders and nonsharehold-
ers to develop a symbiotic relationship toward maximizing
longterm profitability and competitiveness while mnimzing
the need for and possibility of hostile takeovers.294
Reform, therefore, must harness the best of both extremes
of the dialectical development of corporate law. Like the share-
holder primacy model, the operational focus must be the share-
holder. Despite the growth and expansion of corporations and
corporate interests, this group, the investors, remains the ulti-
mate beneficiary of the corporation. Like the corporate welfare
model, the focus must be on longterm performance. The typi-
cal modem corporation is not engaged in a short-term venture;
it is a continuing enterprise and participant in a local (and
often national or international) community.
Any legitimate reform proposal must combine these two
objectives. The only way to maximize longterm corporate prof-
itability-thereby optimizing social welfare-is to provide a
structure and process for institutional shareholders as team
291. Koppes & Gillan, supra note 8, at 30.
292. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 216 ("The long-term
health of the business enterprise is ultimately in the best interests of stock-
holders, the corporation's other constituencies, and the economy as a whole.").
293. See Whitewall, supra note 189, at 85.
294. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Shareholders Unfurl Their Banner: 'Don't
Tread On Us,' Bus. WK., June 11, 1990, at 66, 67 ("If owners and managers can
forge a new relationship-making shareholders' capital more patient in return
for more say-the '90s could be a whole lot less contentious than the takeover-
prone '80s.").
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members with management to focus on longterm corporate per-
formance. The process of corporate governance must en-
courage and reward the substantial role of institutional
investors by giving them a greater voice in governance affairs
and thereby creating an environment in which it is desirable to
be a longterm shareholder.295
A. A PROCESS APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE REFORM
The central dilemma facing corporate law reformers has
been aptly articulated by Professor Bernard Black. Professor
Black notes that shareholder-driven attempts at corporate gov-
ernance reform face insurmountable opposition in state legisla-
tures from local incumbent management lobbies. Thus, any
legislation that passes the legislative gauntlet reflects inevitable
dilution and is essentially worthless. National reform is even
more unlikely because proponents of corporate governance re-
form have to convince fifty legislatures to adopt these politi-
cally unpalatable proposals.29
To have a chance of successful adoption, a proposal for re-
form must be more than theoretically compelling. It must earn
the respect of legislators, managers, and major shareholders.
One of the greatest virtues of current state law is its flexibility.
The benefits of mandatory manager constraining rules come at
a cost of diminished flexibility. Thus, the optimal state law
must be able to change as corporate needs change.29 Reform
efforts should balance this tension between mandatory law and
flexibility.2 98
This tension has been at the heart of the theoretical "nexus
of contracts" model of the corporation. The substantially
mandatory nature of corporate law299 has recently been the fo-
295. A longterm shareholder governance structure should accomplish sev-
eral objectives. While establishing the groundwork for improving incentives,
management accountability, director discretion, and shareholder communica-
tions, this governance structure should also preserve the ability of major
outside shareholders to undertake value-increasing initiatives with the com-
pany. See May 1990 Client Advisory Letter, supra note 21, at 25.
296. Black, supra note 14, at 580.
297. See id. at 581 ("Before imposing minimum standards on corporations,
we need to consider how those standards might be changed should they prove
unwise, and to set up structures that facilitate change. Congressional paralysis
today is such that Congress is a dangerous source for new rules.").
298. See id, at 593 (suggesting that reform efforts which fail to balance
"mandatory law and inflexibility" are "doomed to failure").
299. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1989).
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cus of growing scholarly debate.300 Specifically, to what extent
should the provisions of legislation regulating corporate govern-
ance be mandatory rather than suppletory? Although the ques-
tion appears simple enough, no clear answer exists.30 1
The central concern of corporate law is to minimize the
conflicts of interest stemming from the separation of ownership
and control. As the potential for conflict of interest increases,
the need for implementing procedural safeguards to minimize
the potential ill effects of these conflicting interests corre-
spondingly increases. Thus, for example, "[a] director or senior
executive will normally not be deemed to have breached the
obligation of fair dealing if fair procedures for approval, follow-
ing disclosure, are observed .... ,o 2
Economic and legal scholars often focus upon free choice
and an economic structure of corporate law30 3 in which the cor-
poration is viewed as a complex set of explicit and implicit con-
tracts.30 4 Accordingly, these scholars view corporate law as a
300. Id at 1396; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 14.3, at 372 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that the contract analogy breaks down with
regard to involuntary creditors of a corporation); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 861 (1983)
(advocating the allowance of insider trading in publicly held corporations);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 427 (concluding that federal regula-
tion of shareholders' voting, as opposed to common law rules, imposes costs in
excess of any benefits); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, supra note 6, at 715 (arguing against mandatory sharing of gains in cor-
porate control transactions because unequal division of gains maximizes
investor welfare); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note
14, at 1265 (disputing the corporate governance movement's premise that a sys-
temic governance problem exists).
301. The contractual theory of the corporation is inadequate:
The nature and significance of [the 'nexus of contracts' revolution]
remain obscure because, in some sense, the revolution has simply re-
placed one legal metaphor, the trust, with another legal metaphor,
the nexus of contracts. Unfortunately, the legal drapery of both trust
and contract ill fits the corporate body. Each metaphor distracts in
different ways from the intractable problems with which the law
must deal.
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A
Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1449, 1449 (1989).
For an excellent collection of articles on the debate, see generally Symposium,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
302. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 5.01 cmt. c.
303. As two commentators have noted: "What is open to free choice is far
more important to the daily operation of the firm, and investors' welfare, than
is what the law prescribes." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 62, at 1418.
304. "[Ihe corporate structure is a set of contracts through which manag-
ers ... exercise a great deal of discretion that is 'reviewed' by interactions with
other self-interested actors." Id. at 1418.
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means of enabling contract participants to adopt optimal con-
tractual terms while opting out of suboptimal arrangements
given the extremely varied risks and opportunities which in-
here in our dynamic marketplace. "No one set of terms will be
best for all .. ".."305
Currently, however, corporate law fails to recognize the
critical value of longterm shareholder input amidst increasing
conflicts of interest between shareholders and nonshareholders.
If shareholders are a prime (if not the primary) constituency of
the corporation, why not allow them to create their own corpo-
rate law?30 6
Optimally, then, and consistent with the "nexus of con-
tracts" model, reform should focus primarily on how govern-
ance terms are approved and amended rather than on
articulating substantive terms. This both reduces the risk that
legislators will impose inefficient governance rules and reduces
the need for substantive discretion-limiting rules.30 7 Thus, a
governance framework should set out standards for sharehold-
ers to approve major corporate actions while restricting manag-
ers' ability to control shareholders' agendas.30 8
This Article's proposal therefore emphasizes the process by
which substantive rules are adopted or amended and de-empha-
sizes the specification of new substantive rules. It articulates a
set of approval mechanisms and defines those fundamental
transactions in which these approval mechanisms engage. Es-
sentially, the proposal enhances the role of shareholders by
providing them a place in the process by which fundamental
corporate governance parameters are enacted or modified.
305. Id
306. See Black, supra note 14, at 582 (arguing that for larger public compa-
nies, reform of governance should focus on the process of change rather than
substantive rules).
307. Id at 583 ("If the change governing rules work well, managers will
have less ability to use the charter amendment process or the state legislative
process to alter the manager/shareholder contract, and also less incentive to
try.").
308. Id. at 582; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Bal-
ance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1618, 1621-22 (1989) (arguing for judicial oversight as a necessary complement
to contractual freedom); cf. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 709, 753-54 (1987) (proposing federal law
requiring that state laws "entailing a major change in relations between share-
holders and managers... contain opt-in rather than opt-out provisions").
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B. A PROCEDURAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Consistent with this "process approach," a procedural gov-
ernance framework must set out those circumstances and
transactions needing shareholder input. This framework out-
lines the powers and duties of the board and the rights and
powers of shareholders. Approval requirements should be pro-
portionate to the level of conflict of interest and the degree to
which a transaction fundamentally affects longterm sharehold-
ers' financial interests.
This proposal adopts the following governance concepts:
30 9
(1) The ultimate objective of the corporation should be the maximiza-
tion of longterm shareholder value and welfare.
(2) For the most part, directors are well suited to direct and monitor
management toward maximizing longterm shareholder value.
(3) Directors and managers require substantial discretion to enable
them to operate the corporation creatively and flexibly. Therefore,
managerial discretion should be encouraged by the business judgment
rule.
(4) Managers' and directors' interests sometimes diverge from and
conflict with shareholders' interests.
(5) Longterm shareholders are well suited to guide directors with re-
gard to potential conflicts of interest and fundamental corporate gov-
ernance matters affecting their financial interests. In such
circumstances, longterm shareholders should be afforded a mecha-
nism enabling them to offer guidance.
(6) Directors and managers should be allowed to consider non-
shareholder interests to the extent such consideration does not sub-
stantially compromise shareholders' interests.
The proposed governance framework seeks to balance the
interests of shareholders and nonshareholders while granting
directors enhanced guidance. Shareholders have a right to par-
ticipate meaningfully in the fundamental financial decisions af-
fecting corporate performance and growth, and longterm
corporate health and competitiveness. The provisions for
shareholder input suggested below are limited to conflict situa-
tions and specific financial decisions which are likely to have a
material effect on longterm shareholders. These provisions are
not intended to affect operational decisions best left to
management.
The proposed model legislation seeks to provide a statutory
corporate governance framework which induces shareholders
to invest in corporations for the long term. At a minimum, the
use of "long term" seeks to underscore the concept of meaning-
309. See generally supra note 18 (listing Elliott Weiss's seven fundamental
principles of corporate governance).
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ful shareholder involvement. Corporate management should
be responsive to those major shareholders with proven track
records and shareholders otherwise likely to contribute mean-
ingfully to the corporation's underlying profitability and com-
petitiveness, regardless of any time horizon. Put simply, this
framework recognizes that directors will benefit from the
meaningful input of sophisticated investors who genuinely seek
to maximize underlying corporate welfare.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
1. Powers and Duties of the Board
1.01 Authority of the Board
A corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors310 for the purpose of advancing the interests of the
corporation and its longterm shareholders.
1.02 Standard of Conduct
A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in
good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily pru-
dent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances.311
A director shall, in considering the best interests of the corpora-
tion, place primary emphasis on the interests of longterm sharehold-
ers.312 In considering the best interests of the corporation, a director
310. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of [the
board] ... ."); REVISED MODEL BusINESS AcT § 8.01(b) (1984); cf. Proposed Fi-
nal Draft, supra note 14, § 3.01 ("The management of the business of a... cor-
poration.., should be conducted by or under the supervision of such principal
senior executives.., as are designated by the board." (cross-references omit-
ted)).
We have drafted these provisions broadly to apply to corporations gener-
ally. Although we believe that many of these provisions are appropriate for all
corporations, a legislature may choose to limit their application to certain
types of corporations, such as publicly held corporations.
311. See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION AcT § 8.30(a) (1984); Pro-
posed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 4.01(a).
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the di-
rector's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with the care that an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 4.01(a).
312. While we recognize that this standard is somewhat malleable, it serves
to highlight that directors, exercising their business judgment, should place
shareholder interests as primary. Such a recognition helps to cover a direc-
tor's general obligations in making policy for the corporation and dovetails
with the specific rights of shareholders to have a voice in certain transactions,
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may consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies only to
the extent such consideration will not substantially compromise the
best interests of the longterm shareholders.
3 13
1.03 Shareholder Input
A. Fundamental Changes in the Corporation's Structure or
Governance Regime
No corporation shall directly or indirectly effect a fundamental
change in the corporation's structure or governance regime without
prior shareholder approval, whether or not such approval is otherwise
required pursuant to this statute.
Examples of such circumstances include but are not limited to:
1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation;
2. Adoption or abandonment3 14 of a plan of merger or exchange
including the merger of a subsidiary of the corporation with
or into another entity, where the assets of the surviving entity
exceed twenty percent of the assets of the corporation imme-
diately prior to the transaction;
315
3. Adoption or abandonment of a transfer3 16 of all or substan-
as specified in § 1.03 of this proposal. As Louis Lowenstein, head of Columbia
University's Institutional Investors Project has noted, shareholders should
hold the primary position "'[n]ot because you like them or hold them in high
esteem but because if you don't there is no bottom line, no way to measure
efficiency... The system collapses ... if shareholder interests are not pri-
mary."' Leslie Eaton, Corporate Couch Potatoes: The Awful Truth About
Boards of Directors, BARRON's, Dec. 24, 1990, at 22 (quoting Louis
Lowenstein).
313. Acknowledging the interests of nonshareholder constituencies takes
the model of the corporation as a nexus of contracts into consideration. The
scope of nonshareholder constituencies might be unspecified, as here and in
some state enactments, or be specified to include only certain constituencies,
such as employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers. See Matheson & Olson,
supra note 6, at 1538-45 (analyzing constituency statutes). Given the other as-
pects of our framework and the necessity that directors give primary consider-
ation to longterm shareholder interests, we prefer to omit the designation of
particular constituencies.
314. Most, if not all, corporate statutes require shareholder approval for
adoption of fundamental transactions, such as merger, transfer of assets, and
dissolution, but do not necessarily require shareholder approval for abandon-
ment of such actions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), (d) (1991). We
believe that abandonment of such transactions often fundamentally affects the
corporate governance regime and, accordingly, should also require shareholder
approval.
315. The purpose of this last clause is to include triangular and reverse tri-
angular mergers in which the assets being acquired will be a significant por-
tion of the resulting consolidated entity. The 20% figure parallels a similar
threshold in straight merger situations, in which shareholder approval is not
required if the shares of corporate stock outstanding after the transaction will
not exceed the shares outstanding immediately prior to the transaction. Id.
§ 251(f).
316. This term should be read broadly to include a sale and an exchange or
lease of the corporation's assets.
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tially all of the corporation's assets not in the usual and regu-
lar course of its business, including the pledge of corporate
assets which would have a material effect on shareholder
value or a sale of assets that would leave the corporation
without a significant continuing business;
3 1 7
4. Adoption or abandonment of corporate dissolution
proceedings;
3 1 8
5. Determination of whether to approve an acquisition of shares
which would make the acquiror subject to the provisions of a
business combination statute or other statutory provision
which discriminates against an acquisition of shares that is
not accompanied by board of directors approval;3 1 9
6. Determination of whether to adopt or redeem a shareholder
rights plan or its equivalent, or amend or waive any provision
of such a plan;
32 0
7. Determination of whether to issue debt likely to cause other
of the corporation's debt obligations to be downgraded;32 1
8. Any issuance of securities by the corporation with distribution
or liquidation rights and preferences prior or superior to out-
standing shares;
3 2 2
9. Any issuance of securities with voting rights that are superior
317. See Shareholder Bill of Rights, reprinted in Roland M. Machold, The
American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons
From Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 751, 760 (requiring shareholder ap-
proval for decisions which would "[p]ermit the sale or pledge of corporate as-
sets which would have a material effect on shareholder values").
318. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 275 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACr § 14.02(b), (e) (1984) (requiring approval of dissolution "by
a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast"); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS COR-
PORATION AcT § 14.04 (same for revocation of dissolution proceedings).
319. Many antitakeover statutes empower directors to bypass shareholder
input in business combinations, see supra notes 108-14 and accompany text,
and in control share acquisitions, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying
text.
We believe that shareholders should vote to approve these (and similar)
fundamental changes because they grant directors dispositive power, in effect,
to bypass shareholder input. Currently, antitakeover legislation represents
the most pervasive form of antishareholder transfer of power to directors. We
suggest that other antishareholder legislation (whether or not associated with
takeovers) which discriminates against share acquisitions not accompanied by
director approval should similarly require shareholder approval.
320. These would include, for example, amendments which reduce the per-
centage share purchase necessary to trigger the plan's provisions. See Mathe-
son & Olson, supra note 6, at 1514 (proposing guidelines for the adoption of
shareholder rights plans).
321. Cf Shareholder Bill of Rights, reprinted in Machold, supra note 317,
at 760 (requiring a shareholder vote on decisions which would "[r]esult in the
issuance of debt to a degree which would leverage a company and imperil the
longterm viability of the corporation").
322. This clause is consistent with current legislation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(5) (1991); REVISED MODEL CORPORATE BusINESS ACT
§ 10.04(a), (b) (1984). We would include within the phrase "issuance of securi-
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to the voting rights of outstanding shares;
3 2 3
10. Any issuance of securities where the total voting power of
the corporation's outstanding securities after the issuance ex-
ceeds by twenty percent or more the total voting power of
securities outstanding immediately prior to the
transaction;
3 24
11. Any issuance of a class or series of securities that has sepa-
rate approval or veto rights with respect to any corporate
transaction;
3 2 5
12. Any action of directors which has the foreseeable effect of
substantially deterring unsolicited takeover offers, including
opting into state antitakeover legislation;
32 6
13. Any action of directors which eliminates or limits the rights
of shareholders to consider and vote on the election or re-
moval of directors or the timing or duration of directors'
terms in office;
3 2 7
14. Approval of compensation agreements (other than routine
compensation agreements undertaken in the ordinary course
of business) containing provisions, whether or not dependent
on the occurrence of any event or contingency, that increase,
ties" the grant of a right to purchase securities through mechanisms such as
options or warrants.
323. For example, granting certain classes of stock super-majority voting
power (e.g., two votes per share) would require prior shareholder approval.
324. This requirement parallels current law governing plans of merger
which exempt shareholder approval requirements when "the number of vot-
ing shares outstanding... will not exceed by more than 20% the total number
of voting shares with the surviving corporation .... " REVISED MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORPORATION ACr § 11.03(g)(3)-(4) (1984).
However, our approach includes any issuance of securities in which the
total voting power after issuance exceeds the total voting power immediately
prior to the transaction by 20% or more. For example, shareholder approval
would be required when 20% of the outstanding shares are issued to friendly
parties. Under current law, shareholder approval is required only when such
20% outstanding share issuance results in a statutory merger. See, e.g., id. The
current law thus appears anomalous. Substance should govern over form. Our
reform seeks to encompass all of these non-merger 20% issuances of securities.
325. The creation of a class of stock, such as in dual class capitalization con-
texts, that can prevent transactions which the other shareholders may desire,
may act as a significant bar to corporate transactions and may depress share-
holder value. Other shareholders should have the right to prevent the crea-
tion of such a veto power.
326. This catch-all provision combines ideas from the Proposed Final Draft,
supra note 14, § 6.02 (action of directors that has the foreseeable effect of
blocking unsolicited tender offers) and Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at
1514 (setting out a model act addressing antitakeover issues). This provision
seeks to encompass all actions of directors which, in the director's view, have
the foreseeable effect of substantially deterring hostile changes in control.
327. Cf. Shareholder Bill of Rights, reprinted in Machold, supra note 317,
at 760 (requiring shareholder approval for transactions which would "[a]bridge
or limit the rights of the [shareholders] to ... [c]onsider and vote on the elec-
tion or removal of directors or the timing or length of their term of office").
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directly or indirectly, the current or future compensation of
any officer or director of the corporation;
3 2 8
15. Determination of whether to deny a demand to pursue or
seek dismissal of a derivative claim against members of the
board of directors, officers, employees, or agents of the
corporation;
3 2 9
16. Determination of whether to indemnify members of the
board of directors, officers, employees, or agents with respect
to a derivative action against them.3
3 0
B. Significant Corporate Matters
Under certain circumstances, acting in an informed manner nor-
mally would require meaningful shareholder input.3 3 1 Such input
should be sought when it would, in the director's view, materially en-
hance and inform the director's business judgment, even though not
otherwise required by this Chapter. The director's substantial uncer-
tainty about a particular course of conduct on matters implicating
shareholders' material longterm financial interests shall require
shareholder input. What constitutes meaningful shareholder input
depends on the facts and circumstances of each decision, and may
even require that shareholder approval be obtained. However, a di-
rector's good faith consultation with a Longterm Shareholder Advi-
sory Committee shall be presumed adequate.3 3 2  In certain
circumstances, when obtaining shareholder input is functionally or
temporally impractical, approval by a majority of the independent 3 33
members of the board of directors may substitute for such input.
Examples of circumstances where shareholder input normally
would be required include but are not limited to:
1. Whether to indemnify members of the board of directors, of-
ficers, employees or agents with respect to claims made
against them (other than derivative claims) because they oc-
cupied those positions;
2. Compensation arrangements with senior executive officers of
the corporation, including the right to receive any significant
328. See MIANN. STAT. § 302A.755 Subd. 3 (1990) (banning "golden
parachutes"). We condition the applicability of golden parachute provisions
upon prior shareholder approval.
329. As to dismissal with derivative actions generally, see Proposed Final
Draft, supra note 14, §§ 7.01 to 7.17.
330. For example, Delaware allows indemnity for derivative actions only
when the defendant is "successful." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1991).
331. As to the requirement of acting in a informed manner generally, see
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the "concept of
gross negligence" is the "proper standard" for determining whether a business
judgment is "an informed one").
332. "Longterm Shareholder Advisory Committee" means any committee,
comprised of and approved by the shareholders, primarily designed to repre-
sent the longterm shareholders' interests for purposes consistent with the re-
quirements of Section 1.02 of this proposal.
333. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 14, § 1.15 (defining disinterested
directors as those "who are not interested in the transaction") (cross-refer-
ences omitted).
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stock or cash bonus, severance payment, or other extraordi-
nary payment;
334
3. The selection of independent auditors.
335
IV. ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LONGTERM
SHAREHOLDER MODEL
The essence of law is to provide fair and equitable guide-
lines for the resolution of conflicts between opposing parties.
Accordingly, the current corporate legal landscape, which all
but forecloses meaningful shareholder input in favor of liberat-
ing managerial discretion, deserves careful scrutiny.
A longterm shareholder model flows logically from the dia-
lectical development of corporate law. It synthesizes the eco-
nomically efficient attributes of both the shareholder primacy
norm and the longterm corporate welfare norm.
The longterm shareholder model also flows from the cur-
rent forces shaping corporate law, the "nexus of contracts"
model chief among them. By emphasizing the importance of
procedural safeguards in which both shareholders and other
stakeholders have a voice, the need for corporate law to impose
mandatory, substantive terms is minimized. This enhances the
role of contracting and maximizes the possibility that share-
holders' and stakeholders' expectations will be preserved.
Finally, the proposed governance framework simplifies and
streamlines corporate law. Focusing on procedural issues mini-
mizes the need both to articulate substantive corporate law doc-
trine and to impose legal sanctions for their breach or
disregard. Further, it simultaneously adds vigor to the cur-
rently moribund duties of care and loyalty, without imposing
potentially inefficient or suboptimal substantive governance
rules.
A. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE CORPORATE ACToRs
To better understand the nature of this longterm share-
holder model, a glimpse at how it might operate in practice is
necessary. Accordingly, this section of the Article discusses
the role of the board of directors within the longterm share-
334. Cf. Shareholder Bill of Rights, reprinted in Machold, supra note 317,
at 760 (requiring "approval of at least a majority of independent directors...
to approve [annually] ... [t]he compensation to be provided to each executive
officer of the corporation").
335. See id. (requiring "approval of at least a majority of independent di-
rectors ... to approve [annually] ... the selection of independent auditors").
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holder regime, explores the function of longterm shareholders,
and analyzes the implementation of the proposal given the facts
of a leading corporate law case, Paramount Communications v.
Time, Inc.336
1. The Board's New Role
The longterm shareholder model proposed in this Article
envisions a modified role for the board of directors. The
board's primary function will be to serve as a central mediator
between shareholders and stakeholders. 337 The proposal at-
tempts to reinvigorate the duty of loyalty by requiring boards
to consider the interests of longterm shareholders in conjunc-
tion with stakeholder interests. Moreover, the proposed frame-
work resurrects the duty of care338 by requiring directors,
under certain circumstances, to seek shareholder input as a
minimal procedural safeguard to assure informed decision mak-
ing. Thus, the board would have an affirmative duty to seek
shareholder input in conflict transactions materially affecting
shareholders' longterm financial interests. Board proposals
which effect a fundamental change in the corporation's govern-
ance regime shall require shareholder approval. Any board ac-
tion approved by shareholders should be conclusively presumed
to be in their best interest; the board should be free from liabil-
ity. For significant corporate matters otherwise materially af-
fecting shareholders' longterm financial interests, shareholder
input should be sought. What constitutes meaningful share-
holder input is largely within the board's discretion. 339
336. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
337. Consistent with its view that the board of directors serves as a steward
for shareholders' interests while also serving as an interface between share-
holders and nonshareholders, the Business Roundtable "recognized that it
might be necessary to give shareholders an explicit right to nominate direc-
tors." Business Roundtable 1978, supra note 219, at 3. Unhappily, in its 1990
Report, the Roundtable abandoned this position in favor of strengthening CEO
supremacy. See The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and Ameri-
can Competitiveness (1990), reprinted in 46 Bus. LAw. 241 (1990) [hereinafter
Business Roundtable 1990].
338. Given that the duty of care has all but evaporated, the primary func-
tion of current corporate law is to minimize the possibility of conflicts of inter-
est between shareholders and nonshareholders. See supra part I.D.2.
(describing legislation limiting or eliminating the duty of care).
339. Shareholder approval must be meaningful. In order for this to occur,
the voting shareholders must have adequate disclosure to make informed deci-
sions. For examples of how a shareholder vote may be problematic under cur-
rent laws and practice, see Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1474-80. In addition,
the balancing of shareholder and stakeholder interests requires directors of
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2. The Nature and Role of the "Longterm Shareholder"
When does a shareholder become a "longterm share-
holder?" No neat formula exists. In one sense, longterm share-
holders are those shareholders who have a significant stake in
the future of the corporation. From this perspective, longterm
shareholders mirror shareholder/owners of closely held corpo-
rations. Since they have a substantial stake in the longterm
profitability of a corporation, longterm shareholders seek to
maximize the underlying profit-generating engine of the corpo-
ration. Their legitimacy derives largely from their possession
of a genuine stake in the corporation. Unlike other stakehold-
ers, longterm shareholders are also the owners and ultimate
risk-bearers of the corporation. Thus they have additional in-
centives to hold management accountable. s40
Thus, the pertinent question is: When does a shareholder
of a large publicly held corporation become a bona fide stake-
holder in the longterm profitability of a corporation? Two pos-
sible answers exist. First, a shareholder becomes a longterm
shareholder whenever that shareholder's stock ownership is so
pervasive that the shareholder can expect to hold stock in the
corporation on a continual and recurring basis. Such a situation
frequently occurs with large institutional investors. In a sense,
these massive institutional shareholders are forced to be long-
term shareholders; they do not have the luxury of taking the
"Wall Street walk." Their portfolios are so large that it is un-
reasonable for them to monitor the performance of each corpo-
ration. As a result, these shareholders maximize the return on
the highest caliber. Accordingly, we recommend infusing boards with Gilson
and Kraakman's "professional directors." See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
12. Furthermore, consistent with the longterm shareholder focus, we recom-
mend that board members strive to become "longterm directors." Perhaps
even Martin Lipton would sanction this. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note
12, at 202-03. The result of this is what could be called "longterm professional
directors." We leave open the issue of the nature and extent of shareholder
involvement in the director nomination process. This should be left to each
corporation.
340. One commentator has stated:
I accept the fact that shareholders with the credibility and avowedly
longterm view of ... [CalPERS] have a place in the corporate govern-
ance process. With an enlightened approach . .. both shareholders
and corporate executives have more in common than anything that di-
vides them.... There is a gap that can only be filled by the owners of
the business.
Louis Lowenstein, Shareholders, Humbug! Giving them Top Dollar Could
Cheat Us All, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1990, at BI.
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their shares by indexing their portfolios. 41
At first blush, because they cannot meaningfully monitor
all components of their large portfolios, it seems absurd to im-
agine these indexed investors as "real" shareholders similar to
those in closely held corporations. Currently, indexed share-
holders do not have the incentive and the ability to monitor
managerial performance of all corporations within their portfo-
lios. However, if the corporate law landscape did afford those
major shareholders a voice in certain fundamental procedural
issues, they would have both the incentive and ability to moni-
tor fundamental governance parameters within each of their
investments.
This prospect suggests the possibility of a second type of
longterm shareholder. Given the proposed procedural govern-
ance framework, institutional and other major shareholders
may find it profitable to limit their shareholdings to those cor-
porations susceptible to effective monitoring. Thus, they may
prefer to monitor portions of their investments directly instead
of (or in conjunction with) indexing their funds. A procedural
governance framework like the one proposed in this Article
could allow such direct monitoring.3
3. Longterm Shareholders' Time has Come
The celebrated case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc.34 3 demonstrates the critical need for a procedural
governance framework. The Delaware Supreme Court allowed
Time's board to redesign its proposed business combination
with Warner, thereby eliminating the need for structured
shareholder input. Specifically, Time and Warner originally
agreed upon a stock-for-stock merger in which the Time share-
holders would receive approximately $125 per share. But when
341. Roughly "one-third of all equity investments held by institutional
funds are 'indexed."' Coffee, supra note 13, at 1339 & n.236.
342. Professor Coffee writes:
In theory, a diversified portfolio can be assembled with as few as 15
stocks, and 95% of the value of diversification can be achieved with a
portfolio of only 20 stocks. Clearly, indexing does not require the
purchase of all of the Standard & Poor's 500, and 'excess' diversifica-
tion is thus wasteful because it raises the transaction costs, both in
terms of unnecessary securities transactions and unnecessary moni-
toring. Although it may be impossible for any investment manager to
monitor 500 stocks, even a medium-sized institution could monitor 25
or 50.
Id at 1355 (footnotes and citations omitted).
343. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Paramount entered the drama with a cash bid for $175 (later
raised to $200 per share), Time and Warner revised their plan,
making the transaction a tender offer instead of a merger, thus
circumventing shareholder voting requirements and incurring
an enormous debt burden of seven to ten billion dollars. Pro-
spective earnings evaporated because roughly nine billion dol-
lars of goodwill had to be paid for and amortized.344
Time-Warner shunned shareholder input in favor of: forc-
ing upon shareholders and stakeholders a plan which was at
least $50 to $75 per share below the market's evaluation of the
stock; restructuring the deal so as to preempt shareholder ap-
proval requirements while incurring massive amounts of debt;
refusing to meet with Paramount to discuss its offer; and estab-
lishing a line of succession for managing and directing the com-
pany, thereby bypassing a fundamental function of future
boards of directors elected by shareholders.345
All of this was legitimized by the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision. The Paramount case thus suggests that direc-
tors may ignore shareholders even if the action is patently self-
interested.3 "
This approach runs contrary to this Article's central tenet
that as the potential for conflicts of interest increases, so does
the need for shareholder input.s47 The proposed governance
framework would attempt to foster a fairer and more efficient
outcome. Shareholder approval of the revised Time-Warner
deal would be required since there was a fundamental restruc-
turing of the governance regime in at least four areas. Specifi-
cally, merger negotiations were abandoned; Time-Warner
incurred massive amounts of debt; pre-existing shareholder vot-
ing rights regarding the succession of managers and directors
were preempted; and Time-Warner adopted its poison pill with-
out shareholder approval while ignoring shareholder input in
344. See Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors,
21 STErr. L. REv. 197, 209 (1991).
345. 571 A.2d at 1147-49.
346. The Paramount court explained:
Finally, we note that although Time was required, as a result of Para-
mount's hostile offer, to incur a heavy debt to finance its acquisition
of Warner, that fact alone does not render the board's decision unrea-
sonable so long as the directors could reasonably perceive the debt
load not to be so injurious to the corporation as to jeopardize its well
being.
Id at 1155.
347. See text accompanying supra note 302.
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contemplating the desirability of its redemption.3 48
Time's board should have sought the input of its longterm
shareholders and longterm stakeholders ab initio. Instead, as
encouraged by the permissive Delaware legal landscape, share-
holder input was actively avoided, almost assuring that the
Time board, fraught with self-interest and uncertainty, would
reach a sub-optimal conclusion.
B. BENEFITS OF THE LONGTERm SHAREHOLDER MODEL
1. Enhanced Monitoring and Accountability
To the extent that longterm shareholders are granted a
greater legal basis to express their sentiments regarding mat-
ters in which managements' interests may diverge from other
constituencies, management will more likely be accountable to
those with vested corporate interests, especially longterm
shareholders. Monitoring takes substantial effort. Only those
shareholders with incentives to monitor will undertake the
task. By focusing upon significant procedural and structural is-
sues common to all corporations, the proposed governance
framework harnesses the incentives of longterm shareholders
to monitor significant but limited aspects of corporate govern-
ance for each of their shareholdings.949 The result is that cor-
porations will have procedural safeguards to minimize conflict
situations while holding management accountable to major
longterm shareholders and other longterm stakeholders. More-
over, courts have proven particularly well-suited to assess pro-
cedural fairness.3 0
This proposal sets out only the minimal procedural safe-
guards needed to foster accountability. It is a start. If account-
ability continues to be an issue for any given corporation,
longterm shareholders may find it desirable to offer additional
procedural safeguards.
2. Enhanced Board Decision Making
By soliciting the input of longterm shareholders (including
major stakeholders) in appropriate fundamental transactions,
directors should make better-reasoned decisions. Currently, a
director seeking to balance the needs of shareholders and non-
348. 571 A.2d at 1143-49.
349. For a discussion of process and structural issues currently on institu-
tional shareholders' agenda, see Black, supra note 8, at 836.
350. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (hold-
ing the board to a high standard of procedural integrity and fairness).
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shareholders faces a quagmire of uncertainty unless she ac-
tively seeks shareholder input for fundamental decisions
affecting the corporate governance regime. "By failing to en-
courage shareholder input, the current legal landscape effec-
tively discourages directors from mitigating their uncertainty; it
discourages directors from seeking shareholder guidance."' 35 '
Better decision making also results because the longterm
shareholder model offers a single standard: the longterm
shareholder standard. Rather than leave directors guessing
about what is entailed in a corporate welfare or stakeholder
standard, directors need focus only on a discreet
constituency.35 2
3. Enhanced Economic Efficiency
To maximize economic efficiency, corporate decisions re-
quire an optimal blend of incentives, information, discretion,
and oversight. Incentives are the key. Constituencies with ade-
quate incentives will find ways to increase their available infor-
mation, discretion, and oversight.
Most decisions are best left to managers. For example,
only managers have the incentives and information to perform
and oversee daily operations. Other stakeholders lack incen-
tives and information to participate meaningfully in this opera-
tional domain. What incentives do shareholders have, in their
capacity as shareholders, to monitor management and/or pro-
vide meaningful guidance to directors? Consider an observa-
tion by Easterbrook and Fischel:
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the ap-
propriate incentives .. .to make discretionary decisions. The firm
should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and costs
are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the share-
holders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on
the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased secur-
ity) from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders receive
351. Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1491.
352. See CLARK, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 20 (1986). Dean Clark develops an
argument in favor of the "social value" of having a single goal, such as profit
maximization, for corporations.
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily moni-
tored than a multiple, vaguely defined- goal like the fair and reason-
able accommodation of all affected interests. . . . Assuming
shareholders have some control mechanisms, better monitoring
means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They
are more likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it
efficiently.
I& (footnote omitted).
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most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs.
They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion [or en-
sure that it is exercised on their behalf].
3 5 3
Easterbrook and Fischel further suggest that the shareholders'
position within the firm is unique since only shareholders have
a meaningful stake in every decision made by a corporation.-Im
However, there are two cases when longterm shareholder
input is a sine qua non for maximizing economic efficiency.
First, certain fundamental corporate transactions so affect long-
term shareholders' financial interests that only they possess the
requisite incentives to monitor the integrity of these transac-
tions. In these cases, shareholders can harness the economies
of scales in monitoring and providing input.35 5 These scale
economies allow shareholders to overcome their tendency to-
ward passivity.356 Further, a shareholder who monitors and
provides input on the same type of procedural or structural is-
sue time after time has a heightened incentive and ability to
provide meaningful input. As longterm shareholders find that
their input actually has an impact upon corporate performance,
their incentives to develop more sophisticated skills and means
for providing profit-maximizing monitoring and guidance will
increase, further strengthening economic performance. Thus,
whether an investor today has monitoring skills is irrelevant.
The issue is whether certain types of shareholders may have in-
centives to develop into meaningful monitors given a more
sympathetic governance regime.
Second, certain transactions are so fraught with conflicts of
interest that no one decision maker can make an optimal deci-
sion. In these situations the central decision maker should so-
licit the input from the groups whose interests compete for
supremacy. Here a board must balance the input of managers,
longterm shareholders, and longterm stakeholders. This bal-
ancing of competing interests will more likely lead to an effi-
cient outcome consistent with the longterm objectives and
expectations of all corporate stakeholders. Still, the ultimate
focus must be on longterm shareholder welfare.
353. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 403.
354. Id- at 404.
355. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1352 (noting that "because indexed investors
hold shares in numerous companies, they seem more able to exploit economies
of scale in reaching voting decisions and coordinating to oppose
management").
356. See Black, supra note 13, at 523-24 (noting that the basic tendency for
shareholders is to consider their investment as passive).
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The focus on longterm shareholders maximizes economic
efficiency over time. By harnessing shareholder incentives to
monitor and guide directors, systemic improvements in corpo-
rate governance will result. These improvements in the way
corporate governance powers are allocated guarantee that soci-
ety as a whole will benefit in the long term.
4. Bridging Ownership and Control
By focusing on shareholder voice rather than shareholder
control, ownership and control are bridged rather than united.
In order for shareholders to become significant corporate part-
ners, they must have a genuine stake in the underlying profit-
ability of the enterprise. Although such a stake implies a
longterm commitment and thus limits unhampered liquidity,
some liquidity remains intact.3 7
Moreover, bridging ownership and control implies bridging
the conflicts of interests which inhere in the ownership control
dichotomy. This minimizes conflicts of interest between share-
holders and managers. By soliciting and balancing input from
longterm shareholders, the board is well-situated to arrive at a
decision which eliminates or minimizes the conflicts between
shareholders and nonshareholders.
C. RESPONDING TO POSSIBLE CRITICISM
1. Shareholders Make Poor Monitors
The central scholarly criticism of the model proposed in
this Article might proceed as follows: Plagued by agency costs,
conflicts of interest, collective action problems, and a maze of
regulatory prohibitions, institutional investors lack the capacity
and incentive to monitor their shareholdings meaningfully.358
Some would further argue that even if shareholders could ef-
fectively monitor their portfolios, they may prefer unhampered
liquidity over voice.3 59
We reject the claim that shareholder passivity is inevita-
ble36 0 by attempting to redefine the parameters of monitoring.
357. For a thoughtful discussion of this liquidity/control dichotomy, see
Coffee, supra note 13 (concluding that "those institutions that most desire li-
quidity would make poor monitors").
358. For scholarship exploring possible barriers to effective shareholder
monitoring, see Black, supa note 13; Rock, supra note 13; see also Black,
supra note 8, at 820-30 (describing the legal obstacles to shareholder action).
359. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 1287.
360. See Black, supra note 13, at 525 (similar contention).
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First, the definition of what constitutes meaningful shareholder
monitoring is explicitly limited to those procedural and struc-
tural conflict issues materially affecting longterm shareholders'
financial interests. This proposal does not consider the incen-
tives or abilities of shareholders to monitor beyond this limited
domain.
Second, by redrafting corporate law, this proposal enhances
the incentives and abilities of shareholders to monitor process
and structural conflict issues. Some institutional investors will
seek to monitor; others may never want to. The outcome de-
pends in part on the cumulative effect of institutional conflict
of interests, incentives, and regulatory hurdles, an outcome no
one can predict at this time.361
Again, the issue is not whether shareholders today are poor
monitors, but whether they can become effective monitors
under a different legal regime. Moreover, those institutional
investors who do not choose to monitor can delegate the task to
institutional directors, proxy advisors, or other outside monitor-
ing specialists. If monitoring skills become sought-after, insti-
tutions will develop them.
2. Managerial Discretion is Compromised
The main argument raised by managers and directors
might be that shareholders' ability to "veto" pro-management
transactions amounts to shareholders' "management by refer-
endure. 362 This, of course, brings into focus the conflicts of in-
terest stemming from the tension between maximizing
managerial discretion versus harnessing shareholders' incen-
tives to monitor that discretion.
The proposed governance framework may actually increase
risk taking and managerial discretion. By obtaining meaningful
shareholder input, directors have done everything necessary to
minimize conflicts of interest while maximizing their informed
judgment. They have met the burdens imposed by the duties of
care and loyalty. Knowing that shareholder approval mini-
mizes their liability, the proposed framework will encourage di-
rectors to take risks on the content of items submitted to
shareholders for approval.
Finally, the extent of shareholder intrusion into the mana-
361. See ic- at 608.
362. For an example of this viewpoint, see Business Roundtable 1990,
supra note 337 (noting that "[e]xcessive corporate governance by referendum
in the proxy statement can... chill innovation and risk-taking").
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gerial domain is limited to significant conflict situations which
affect longterm shareholders' financial interests. Operational
issues remain within managers' exclusive domain.
CONCLUSION
This Article foretells the significant role of the longterm
shareholder in modern corporate governance. Signs of this in-
evitability abound. Holdings of institutional investors are
markedly increasing while the concentration of their holdings
intensifies. Major shareholders are developing increasing ex-
pertise in longterm corporate matters. Institutional sharehold-
ers are becoming increasingly unsettled by the growing tides of
anti-shareholderism.
This Article proposes a model for the role of the longterm
shareholder and buttresses this theoretical model with a pro-
posed statutory corporate governance framework. The proposal
grants major shareholders a meaningful opportunity and mech-
anism for enhanced participation in formulating longterm cor-
porate affairs. It affords them an unprecedented incentive to
invest for the long term, not unlike that of share-
holder/managers of closely held corporations.
As a result, ownership and control will be more aligned
than under the current system. From a longterm perspective,
many of the advantages of entrepreneurialism (marked by the
union of ownership and control) and managerialism (marked
by the continued high level of discretion granted directors to-
ward harnessing managerial expertise) promise to maximize
economic prosperity to society's benefit.
One significant feature of this proposal is that it flows logi-
cally from both the nature of corporate governance and the
current forces shaping the destiny of corporate law. First, cor-
porate law appears to evolve dialectically. Accordingly, reform
proposals ultimately must confront this progression in order to
promote the synthesis of shareholder primacy and longterm
corporate welfare. Second, reform must harness the incentives
of shareholders toward maximizing economic efficiency. To
this end, this Article emphasizes the need for a procedural gov-
ernance framework. Such a "process approach" flows naturally
from the very forces which support the "nexus of contracts" in-
terpretation of corporate law.
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